{"id":15358,"date":"2018-06-20T11:44:40","date_gmt":"2018-06-20T09:44:40","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/afteegypt.org\/%d8%aa%d8%ad%d8%aa-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b6%d9%88%d8%a1\/2018\/06\/20\/15358-afteegypt.html"},"modified":"2018-06-20T11:53:07","modified_gmt":"2018-06-20T09:53:07","slug":"egyptian-parliament-approves-cybercrime-law-legalizing-the-blocking-of-websites-and-full-surveillance-of-egyptians","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/afteegypt.org\/en\/advocacy-en\/joint-statements-en\/2018\/06\/20\/15358-afteegypt.html","title":{"rendered":"Egyptian Parliament approves Cybercrime Law legalizing the blocking of websites and full surveillance of Egyptians"},"content":{"rendered":"
The Association for Freedom of Thought and Expression (AFTE) and Access Now condemn the Egyptian Parliament\u2019s <\/span>approval<\/span><\/a> of the <\/span>Law on Combating Cybercrimes <\/span><\/i>(\u201cCybercrime Law\u201d), which provides new authority for online surveillance, blocking of websites, and monitoring of internet users and the use of communications services in Egypt. Approval of this draft is in line with a series of rights-harming laws the Parliament has approved since its election in 2015, most notably the Law of Civil Associations (<\/span>1<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>2<\/span><\/a>), the Law of <\/span>Institutional Regulation of the Press and Media<\/span><\/a>, and the <\/span>Protest Law<\/span><\/a>. These laws serve to close space for civil society and deprive citizens of their rights, especially the right to freedom of expression and of association.<\/span><\/p>\n \n Background<\/b><\/span><\/p>\n The Cybercrime Law has a total of 45 articles. The final draft for the law was submitted by the government and approved by Parliament on 5 June 2018. The law had been discussed in the Communications and Information Technology Committee, which approved it in principle on 5 March 2018. Debate of the law had been preceded by several attempts at passage over the past three years, including a draft prepared by the Ministry of Justice in March 2015 and <\/span>another draft submitted by MP Tamer Chehawi in May 2016.<\/span><\/a> The law, after passing in parliament, requires the President\u2019s signature to enter into force. However, if the president fails to sign it within 30 days, it is automatically entered into force.<\/span><\/p>\n \n What\u2019s in the law<\/b><\/span><\/p>\n Article 7: Censorship <\/span><\/i><\/span><\/p>\n This law legalizes broad censorship of the internet and enables executive authorities to block websites, a practice that Egyptian authorities have been employing since <\/span>24 May 2017<\/span><\/a>. To date, <\/span>the number of blocked sites in Egypt has reached at least 500<\/span><\/a>. Article 7 of the <\/span>Cybercrime Law<\/span><\/a> gives the investigative authority the power to order a website blocked whenever it deems the content to constitute a crime or a threat to security, or a danger to national security or the economy. The investigative authority submits its blocking order to a competent court within 24 hours, and the court issues its decision within a period not exceeding 72 hours, either accepting or rejecting the order. Article 7 effectively legalizes the blocking of websites. After the passage of this law, authorities can safely rely on Article 7 to censor content online. <\/span><\/p>\n In addition to authorizing investigatory authorities to order the blocking of websites, Article 7 also grants security authorities this power, with the ability to order the <\/span>National Telecom Regulatory Agency<\/span><\/a> (NTRA) to implement the decision by telling internet service providers (ISPs) to block a website, link, or specific content. Article 7 obliges ISPs to execute an order as soon as it is received, in \u201can urgent manner due to imminent danger or damage.\u201d This is at the discretion of the security authority, not subject to any criteria that would prevent arbitrary abuse of this power. The security investigators ordering a block must then, within 48 hours, present the decision — after it has already been implemented \u00a0— to competent investigative authorities, who in turn present it to a competent judicial authority within 24 hours. The court then issues its decision within 72 hours, either approving or rejecting the decision. <\/span><\/p>\n This means that intelligence bodies have greater authority than the investigative authorities, whose decisions are neither valid nor executed except upon a judicial decision by the competent court.<\/span><\/p>\n \n Broad and vague provisions, open to abuse<\/span><\/i><\/span><\/p>\n The reasons articulated in the Cybercrime Law for blocking websites are vague and broad. For example, the law defines national security as \u201call that is related to the independence, stability, and security of the homeland and its unity and territorial integrity,\u201d and all affairs \u201crelated to the Presidency of the Republic, the Defense Council, the National Security Council, the armed forces, military production, the Ministry of Interior, the General Intelligence, the Administrative Oversight Authority, and the organs affiliated with those bodies.\u201d Investigative bodies have used these same broad, vague grounds for launching cases against demonstrators and activists (accusing them of calling for demonstrations, publishing crimes, such as in <\/span>Case 173 against civil society organizations<\/span><\/a>). The failure to clearly define the terms for violating the law means that authorities could misuse or abuse the law to censor what they see as contrary to their policies, justifying censorship as a way to protect national security.<\/span><\/p>\n \n