{"id":40223,"date":"2026-03-05T11:53:33","date_gmt":"2026-03-05T09:53:33","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/afteegypt.org\/?p=40223"},"modified":"2026-03-05T11:53:33","modified_gmt":"2026-03-05T09:53:33","slug":"the-implementation-gap-freedom-of-expression-between-international-recommendations-and-public-policy-in-egypt","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/afteegypt.org\/en\/research-en\/2026\/03\/05\/40223-afteegypt.html","title":{"rendered":"The Implementation Gap: Freedom of Expression Between International Recommendations and Public Policy in Egypt"},"content":{"rendered":"<h4><span style=\"background-color: #800000; color: #ffffff;\"><strong>Contents<\/strong><\/span><\/h4>\n<p><span style=\"color: #800000;\"><strong>Methodology<\/strong><strong>\u00a0<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color: #800000;\"><strong>Introduction<\/strong><strong>\u00a0<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color: #800000;\"><strong>Section 1: Freedom of Expression and Access to Information within the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) Framework.<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color: #800000;\"><strong>Section 2: Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in the National Human Rights Strategy<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color: #800000;\"><strong>Section 3:<\/strong> <strong>Proposed Mechanisms for Translating UPR Recommendations into Policies on the File of Freedom of Expression and Access to Information<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color: #800000;\"><strong>\u00a0<\/strong><strong>Conclusion<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<h4><span style=\"background-color: #800000; color: #ffffff;\"><strong>Methodology:<\/strong><\/span><\/h4>\n<p>This paper examines the transformation of the recommendations received by the Egyptian government during the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) into concrete, actionable policies in the context of preparing the National Human Rights Strategy (2026\u20132031). To do so, the paper employs both legal analysis and policy analysis as its primary methodological tools. The paper draws on relevant international human rights instruments, most notably the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), alongside the Egyptian Constitution and a range of domestic laws governing freedom of expression and access to information.<\/p>\n<h4><span style=\"background-color: #800000; color: #ffffff;\"><strong>Introduction:<\/strong><\/span><\/h4>\n<p>Despite Egypt\u2019s formal acceptance of a significant number of UPR recommendations, their impact on public policy and executive action remains marginal. This formal acceptance has not translated into tangible reforms or clear institutional change. Addressing this gap is vital in light of preparations for a new National Human Rights Strategy, envisioned as a continuation of the first strategy (2021\u20132026) and expected to serve as the principal governmental framework for fulfilling Egypt\u2019s international commitments.<\/p>\n<p>Against this backdrop, the paper focuses on translating recommendations on freedom of expression and access to information from broad commitments into concrete, actionable policies. By embedding these recommendations within the national strategy, the paper seeks to stimulate a shift toward practical interventions that yield a measurable improvement in the domestic rights environment.<\/p>\n<p>The UPR recommendations concerning freedom of expression and access to information carry particular significance, as this right represents a foundational prerequisite for the exercise of other civil and political rights. As well, it also marks a section, in which Egypt has consistently received a high number of repeated recommendations across multiple review cycles, without corresponding developments in public policy or meaningful legislative reform.<\/p>\n<p>The core issue addressed in this paper is the lack of a clear mechanism for translating UPR recommendations on freedom of expression and access to information into binding national policies. This gap is further widened by the first National Human Rights Strategy\u2019s reliance on broad formulations that lacks both substantive legislative reforms and measurable implementation indicators.<\/p>\n<p>The paper is structured into three sections; The first section examines freedom of expression and access to information in the light of UPR, providing an overview of the recommendations addressed to Egypt in this issue and the government\u2019s response. The second section analyzes the National Human Rights Strategy, highlighting what it addresses and crucially what it overlooks concerning freedom of expression, digital rights, media freedom, freedom of creativity, access to information, and academic freedom. Finally, the third section proposes practical mechanisms for translating UPR recommendations on these issues into clearly defined, actionable policies within the framework of the national strategy.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<h4><span style=\"background-color: #800000; color: #ffffff;\"><strong>Section 1: Freedom of Expression and Access to Information within UPR Framework:<\/strong><\/span><\/h4>\n<p>The Universal Periodic Review (UPR) is a United Nations mechanism established in 2006 by UN General Assembly Resolution 60\/251, to periodically review the human rights records of all UN member states. Adapting a participatory and comprehensive approach, the UPR allows each state to review its international obligations, while enabling other states to provide concrete recommendations to enhance the protection of fundamental rights.<\/p>\n<p>All members of the Human Rights Council participate in the review, where reviewed states submit national reports alongside the Secretary-General\u2019s report and submissions from NGOs and independent national bodies. The UPR is characterized as a cooperative, rather than punitive, evaluation mechanism; within this approach, the UPR offers states a structured action plan to improve their human rights record. It also serves as an official database for tracking recommendations and their implementation within national policy frameworks.<a href=\"#_ftn1\" name=\"_ftnref1\"><sup>[1]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Egypt has participated regularly in the Universal Periodic Review since joining the Human Rights Council, undergoing multiple review cycles that assessed its human rights record across a wide range of issues.<a href=\"#_ftn2\" name=\"_ftnref2\"><sup>[2]<\/sup><\/a> During Egypt\u2019s most recent review cycle in January 2025, the government received over 370 recommendations from 137 states aimed at improving the human rights situation. These recommendations covered a wide spectrum of concerns, including torture, pretrial detention, enforced disappearance, asylum, and other violations.<\/p>\n<p>Following a review and the consolidation of similar entries, the UPR Working Group issued a report containing 343 recommendations. According to Egypt\u2019s response memorandum, the government fully accepted 264 recommendations (77%), partially supported 16 (5%), and noted 62 others (18%).<a href=\"#_ftn3\" name=\"_ftnref3\"><sup>[3]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Despite the government\u2019s acceptance of a significant number of these recommendations, a widening gap persists between declared international commitments and their actual implementation on the ground, particularly with issues of freedom of and expression. Certain restrictive legislations, security measures, and practices continue to hinder the translation of recommendations into tangible policies.<\/p>\n<p>The right to freedom of thought and expression is a fundamental human right, underscored by numerous international instruments that define its scope and establish states\u2019 obligations for its protection. Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) states that &#8216;Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.&#8217;<a href=\"#_ftn4\" name=\"_ftnref4\"><sup>[4]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Similarly, Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) recognizes this right, while outlining the permissible restrictions for specific purposes such as protecting national security or the rights of others, and always in accordance with the principles of necessity and proportionality. <a href=\"#_ftn5\" name=\"_ftnref5\"><sup>[5]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Furthermore, regional instruments such as the African Charter on Human and Peoples&#8217; Rights, along with the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders, emphasize that freedom of expression entails the protection of journalists and human rights advocates from any threat or harassment. These rules also guarantee citizens&#8217; rights to access information and participate freely in public discourse. Consequently, freedom of thought and expression is recognized as a fundamental right, extending beyond personal opinion to include media freedom, scientific research, political participation, and access to information. This positions the right as a cornerstone for ensuring democracy, good governance, and protection for other human rights.<a href=\"#_ftn6\" name=\"_ftnref6\"><sup>[6]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>In this regard, Egypt received approximately 31 recommendations related to freedom of expression and information access during the latest UPR cycle, accounting for over 9% of the 343 total recommendations. Of these, 11 recommendations concentrate directly on freedom of thought and expression, while the remaining recommendations engage the issue indirectly through related concerns such as media freedom, the protection of journalists, and guarantees for access to information.<\/p>\n<p>These recommendations centered on several key pillars: promotion of freedom of opinion and expression for all citizens without discrimination or suppression including digital rights; ensuring press independence and media freedom; and shielding journalists from harassment or arbitrary detention. Furthermore, they called for the protection of human rights defenders and activists exercising their right to peaceful expression, a thorough review of restrictive laws to align them with international standards, and the release of prisoners of conscience, while ending the use of detention as a tool to stifle free speech.<\/p>\n<p><span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong> These recommendations are further detailed as follows:<\/strong><\/span><a href=\"#_ftn7\" name=\"_ftnref7\"><sup>[7]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Recommendation 34:<\/strong> Continue to work on raising awareness of the importance of respecting religious and cultural diversity and the values of tolerance and coexistence among various segments of society, especially in rural areas (Morocco). The Egyptian government has supported this recommendation.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Recommendation 41:<\/strong> Strengthen the implementation of the National Human Rights Strategy, especially in the areas of civil and political rights, and human rights education and capacity-building (Thailand). The Egyptian government has supported this recommendation.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Recommendation 45:<\/strong> Continue to regularly assess the implementation of the National Dialogue and follow up accordingly (T\u00fcrkiye). The Egyptian government has supported this recommendation.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Recommendation 88: <\/strong>Release all those detained for peacefully exercising their right to freedom of association or their right to freedom of expression or detained solely for actual or perceived links to political parties or groups (New Zealand). The Egyptian government has noted this recommendation. Egypt rejects any implication that individuals are imprisoned for exercising their rights, such as freedom of expression, or due to their affiliation with specific political groups or parties. It maintains that all detainees are individuals convicted of criminal offenses following judicial proceedings that adhere to the standards of due process and fair trial.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Recommendation 89:<\/strong> Release all detainees held for exercising their right to freedom of expression and lift restrictions on news and social media websites in line with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland). The Egyptian government has noted this recommendation, providing the same commentary as applied to the preceding recommendation.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Recommendation 90: <\/strong>Promptly release Alaa Abd el-Fattah and all other human rights defenders imprisoned for exercising their freedom of expression (Luxembourg); The Egyptian government has noted this recommendation. Egypt maintains its rejection of any claims suggesting that individuals are detained for exercising their fundamental rights, including the right to freedom of expression.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Recommendation 91<\/strong>: Release human rights defender Alaa Abd el-Fattah (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland). The Egyptian government has noted this recommendation, providing the same commentary as applied to the preceding recommendation.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Recommendation 107:<\/strong> Stop the use of counter-terrorism measures to detain peaceful protesters, journalists and human rights defenders (Canada). The Egyptian government has noted this recommendation, maintaining that Egypt\u2019s Counter-Terrorism Law is strictly concerned with crimes of a terrorist nature.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Recommendation 126:<\/strong> Continue ongoing efforts to ensure freedom of religion and belief (Pakistan). The Egyptian government has supported this recommendation.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Recommendation 127: <\/strong>Continue to take concrete measures to guarantee religious tolerance and diversity (Sierra Leone). The Egyptian government has supported this recommendation.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Recommendation 128:<\/strong> Continue and sustain efforts to promote freedom of opinion and expression, including considering a review of relevant legislation (Nigeria). The Egyptian government has supported this recommendation.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Recommendation 129: <\/strong>Take steps to promote freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly, in accordance with Egypt\u2019s constitutional provisions and international commitments (Republic of Korea). The Egyptian government has supported this recommendation.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Recommendation 130:<\/strong> Promote and protect freedom of expression and a safe and secure environment for human rights defenders, civil activists, journalists and media workers (Latvia); The Egyptian government has supported this recommendation. The Egyptian government has supported this recommendation.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Recommendation 131: <\/strong>Safeguard freedom of expression, ensuring alignment with international law and promoting independent media free from censorship and undue restrictions (Brazil). The Egyptian government has supported this recommendation.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Recommendation 132: <\/strong>Take the necessary measures to ensure that human rights defenders can work safely and exercise their right to freedom of expression (Spain). The Egyptian government has supported this recommendation.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Recommendation 133: <\/strong>Ensure that criminal laws are not used to silence journalists, human rights defenders and lawyers and bring relevant legislation in line with international human rights law (Liechtenstein). The Egyptian government has noted this recommendation. It asserts that the Egyptian Constitution and national legislation prohibit the use of criminal law to curtail freedom of opinion and expression. Furthermore, the Public Prosecution and the Judiciary, as independent authorities, exercise oversight to ensure these protections are upheld.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Recommendation 134:<\/strong> Guarantee the independence and safety of lawyers, journalists and human rights defenders (Czechia). The Egyptian government has supported this recommendation.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Recommendation 136:<\/strong> Ensure freedom of expression online and offline, and freedom of association and assembly, including by allowing peaceful assembly (Norway). The Egyptian government has supported this recommendation, noting that it is already implemented.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Recommendation 137:<\/strong> Guarantee and protect effectively the right to peaceful assembly, aligning national provisions with international human rights standards (Chile). The Egyptian government has supported this recommendation, noting that it is already implemented.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Recommendation 139:<\/strong> Guarantee the rights to freedom of expression, assembly and peaceful association, facilitating a favourable, free and safe environment for their exercise, including online (Costa Rica). The Egyptian government has supported this recommendation.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Recommendation 140: <\/strong>Review all requirements unduly restricting freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, freedom of expression and media freedom, both offline and online (Estonia). The Egyptian government has noted this recommendation. Egypt rejects the false and misleading implication regarding the existence of requirements that restrict the freedoms of peaceful assembly, expression, and association.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Recommendation 141: <\/strong>Guarantee the freedom of expression and freedom of the media and press, online and offline (Germany). The Egyptian government has supported this recommendation.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Recommendation<\/strong> <strong>142:<\/strong> Ensure the right to freedom of expression both online and offline for all, including by enabling all journalists and human rights defenders to carry out their work without fear of reprisals and by enabling all Egyptians to have access to free and independent information (Kingdom of the Netherlands). The Egyptian government has supported this recommendation.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Recommendation 143:<\/strong> Release all persons detained for peacefully exercising their legitimate freedoms of opinion, expression and assembly, particularly those whose pretrial detention has exceeded legally prescribed limits (Australia). The Egyptian government has noted this recommendation. Egypt rejects the erroneous assertions contained therein.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Recommendation 145: <\/strong>Repeal restrictive NGO laws and protect freedom of expression (Austria). The Egyptian government has partially supported this recommendation. Egypt supports the latter part concerning the &#8216;protection of freedom of expression.&#8217; However, regarding the first part, the government maintains that there are no restrictive substantive requirements within Egyptian law governing the registration or operation of civil society organizations.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Recommendation 146:<\/strong> Remove restrictions on civil society so that NGOs and human rights defenders can operate freely, and unblock access to online independent news platforms and media (New Zealand). The Egyptian government has noted this recommendation. Egypt rejects the erroneous assertions contained therein regarding the existence of restrictions on non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and independent media platforms.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Recommendation 148: <\/strong>Assure that all legislation impacting the activities and rights of human rights defenders are in line with international human rights standards, by rescinding or amending laws such as those on civic work, cybercrime, regulation of the press and media and counter-terrorism (Belgium). The Egyptian government has noted this recommendation.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Recommendation 153:<\/strong> Guarantee the rights to freedom of expression and the press, including by adopting a law on access to information and unblocking the websites of independent media (Switzerland). The Egyptian government has partially supported this recommendation. Egypt supports the first part of the recommendation up to the phrase &#8216;access to information.&#8217;<\/li>\n<li><strong>Recommendation 155: <\/strong>Continue efforts to ensure the freedom of the press and the right of access to information (India). The Egyptian government has supported this recommendation.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Recommendation 157:<\/strong> Reform laws on immorality to prevent their use as a tool to restrict fundamental rights and freedoms, especially those of activists, women and the LGBTIQ+ community (Chile). The Egyptian government has noted this recommendation. Egypt rejects the assertion contained therein, maintaining that no laws are utilized as tools to curtail fundamental rights and freedoms.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Recommendation 329: <\/strong>Repeal Act No. 10 (1961) and article 157 of the Penal Code, which may be used to target persons of diverse sexual orientation or gender identities and expressions or sexual characteristics (Iceland). The government has noted this recommendation. Egypt rejects the erroneous assertion contained therein, maintaining that no laws are utilized as a tool for prosecution based on sexual orientation.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Of the recommendations directed to Egypt regarding freedom of expression and the access to information, 27 focused specifically on freedom of expression, while 6 recommendations addressed the right of access to information. Alongside, 13 recommendations were dedicated to media freedom. Notably, none of the recommendations addressed the issues of freedom of creativity or academic freedom.<\/p>\n<p>The Egyptian government fully supported 17 recommendations, partially supported two, and noted 12 others. This response reflects a selective pattern; acceptance was primarily concentrated on recommendations of a general nature\u2014such as those calling for continued efforts or the promotion of human rights awareness\u2014which do not require substantive legislative changes or a fundamental review of existing policies.<\/p>\n<p>Meanwhile, the government \u201cnoted\u201d a significant number of more substantive and politically sensitive recommendations, signaling no commitment to their implementation. This was particularly evident in recommendations concerning the review of legislations restricting freedom of expression, which require substantive changes such as ending the prosecution of journalists or releasing prisoners of individuals detained for expressing their views. In its response, the government justified this stance by asserting that there are no prisoners of conscience in Egypt and maintained that Counter-Terrorism Law is applied exclusively in terrorism-related cases, not against journalists or human rights defenders. It further asserted that Egyptian law does not permit the use of criminal provisions to restrict freedom of opinion and expression. <a href=\"#_ftn8\" name=\"_ftnref8\"><sup>[8]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<h4><span style=\"background-color: #800000;\"><strong><span style=\"color: #ffffff;\">Section Two: Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in the National Human Rights Strategy\u00a0<\/span> <\/strong><\/span><\/h4>\n<p>On 11 September 2021, the government launched the National Strategy for Human Rights.<a href=\"#_ftn9\" name=\"_ftnref9\"><sup>[9]<\/sup><\/a> This announcement was accompanied by an extensive campaign directed at international public opinion, in an attempt to improve the Egyptian government&#8217;s image in response to its deteriorating human rights record.<\/p>\n<p>In this regard, the government took several steps that fell short of achieving a broad shift in the human rights situation. These measures included lifting the state of emergency nationwide in October 2021, President El-Sisi\u2019s invitation during the &#8216;Egyptian Family Iftar&#8217; for a national dialogue inclusive of the opposition, and the reactivation of the Presidential Pardon Committee to oversee the submission of names of several prisoners of conscience to the President for pardon. <a href=\"#_ftn10\" name=\"_ftnref10\"><sup>[10]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>The strategy was developed by the Supreme Standing Committee for Human Rights (SSCHR), a body established by Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly in November 2018. The Committee is chaired by the Minister of Foreign Affairs (or their designee) and includes representatives from the following ministries and entities: the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Social Solidarity, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs, the Ministry of Interior, the General Intelligence Service, the Administrative Control Authority, the National Council for Women, the National Council for Childhood and Motherhood, the National Council for Disability Affairs, the State Information Service, and the Public Prosecution. <a href=\"#_ftn11\" name=\"_ftnref11\"><sup>[11]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>According to its establishing decree, the Committee is tasked with several mandates, including: drafting a national human rights strategy and corresponding action plans for implementation by relevant authorities and monitoring their progress; formulating a unified Egyptian vision to be presented in international and regional forums; following up on the roadmap for supporting and promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms; preparing Egypt\u2019s file for UPR mechanism before the UN Human Rights Council; and monitoring the implementation of recommendations accepted by Egypt while proposing the necessary solutions for their execution. <a href=\"#_ftn12\" name=\"_ftnref12\"><sup>[12]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>The Committee held its initial preparatory meetings in July 2020, with the participation of civil society representatives.<a href=\"#_ftn13\" name=\"_ftnref13\"><sup>[13]<\/sup><\/a> The launch of the National Strategy came amid intense criticism of the Egyptian regime\u2019s human rights record, underscored by 372 recommendations directed at Egypt during UPR in November 2019.<a href=\"#_ftn14\" name=\"_ftnref14\"><sup>[14]<\/sup><\/a> In September 2025, President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi directed the initiation of preparations for a new human rights strategy, set to take effect upon the conclusion of the current framework (2021\u20132026).<a href=\"#_ftn15\" name=\"_ftnref15\"><sup>[15]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>The Strategy is structured around four pillars. The first, \u201cCivil and Political Rights,\u201d addresses freedoms of expression, media, and association, as well as fair trial guarantees, the prohibition of torture, and the rule of law. The second pillar, \u201cEconomic, Social, and Cultural Rights,\u201d is the most detailed, focusing on education, health, labor, housing, and social protection. Closely aligned with state development plans, it prioritizes social rights as they are perceived to be less politically sensitive and more consistent with the national development discourse. The third pillar addresses the rights of vulnerable groups, this pillar focuses on protection against discrimination, enhancing participation, and service provision; however, it largely relies on existing programs without introducing substantive changes. Finally, the pillar on \u201cHuman Rights Education and Capacity Building\u201d centers on awareness-raising and training initiatives, framing the problem primarily as one of insufficient human rights culture rather than policy deficiencies. This approach has drawn criticism for overlooking the structural causes of human rights violations.<\/p>\n<p>The strategy represents the first comprehensive official document issued by the state to provide a general framework for organizing its human rights policies over a five-year period (2021\u20132026). It was presented as a step aimed at mainstreaming human rights into public policy and linking them to the sustainable development and Egypt\u2019s Vision 2030, reflecting an official conception that frames rights as an integral component of state-building rather than merely an international legal obligation.<a href=\"#_ftn16\" name=\"_ftnref16\"><sup>[16]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>Regarding the right to freedom of expression and access to information, the strategy targets a number of recommendations;<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Enacting a law to regulate the right of access to official information, data, and statistics, and their circulation.<\/li>\n<li>Promoting a climate and culture of pluralism and diversity of opinions and perspectives on various public issues.<\/li>\n<li>Continuing state efforts to protect media professionals and journalists while performing their work, within the framework of the Constitution and relevant organizing laws.<\/li>\n<li>Enhancing the right to exercise freedom of opinion and expression, addressing any violations within the framework of the Constitution and organizing laws, and conducting periodic reviews of these laws to ensure the exercise of this right is guaranteed in accordance with the Constitution and Egypt&#8217;s international obligations.<\/li>\n<li>Issuing a comprehensive Code of Conduct covering all aspects of the media and press, including digital media and social networking sites, to ensure the regulation of freedom of expression without infringing on the freedoms of others, drawing on international experiences in line with the Constitution and international obligations.<\/li>\n<li>Raising societal awareness on the importance of freedom of expression and conducting training for press and media practitioners on the boundaries of this freedom and instances of its violation.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Although the strategy includes the right to freedom of expression among its stated priorities within civil and political rights, its treatment of this right tends to be limited and lacking in legislative and policy depth. Furthermore, these measures lean more toward procedural and rhetorical formalities rather than substantive structural reforms that address existing legal restrictions, practical constraints, and actual violations on the ground.<\/p>\n<p>As previously noted, the recommendations emphasize &#8216;promoting a culture of pluralism,&#8217; &#8216;raising awareness,&#8217; and &#8216;issuing codes of conduct,&#8217; without being coupled with a fundamental review of the legal and legislative framework that serves as the primary source of restrictions on this right. This includes, for instance, the Anti-Cybercrime and Information Technology Crimes Law (No. 175 of 2018), the Law Regulating the Press, Media, and the Supreme Council for Media Regulation (No. 180 of 2018), as well as certain provisions of the Penal Code criminalizing the publication of \u201cfalse news.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>In contrast, the strategy merely refers to the &#8216;enactment of a law regulating the right of access, obtain, and disseminate official information, data, and statistics &#8216;.\u00a0 Such framing fails to address the extensive restrictions imposed on the circulation of information under the pretext of national security or confidentiality. Consequently, this transforms the recommendation into a mere formal commitment, lacking effective implementation or practical enforcement, and severely hampering the ability of journalists, researchers, and citizens to exercise their right to access official information. Furthermore, while the strategy recommended amending the Criminal Procedure Code to ensure the protection of witnesses and whistleblowers, this has yet to be realized. This ongoing delay directly undermines transparency, impedes the exposure of violations and corruption, and weakens the overall environment for freedom of expression.<\/p>\n<p>In the same vein, despite referring to &#8216;protecting media professionals and journalists&#8217; and &#8216;issuing a comprehensive code of conduct for all media fields, including digital and social media,&#8217; the strategy conspicuously lacks clear commitments to abolish or amend custodial penalties for publishing offenses. Such penalties constitute one of the most significant structural obstacles to ensuring a safe and enabling environment for journalistic work and media freedoms.<\/p>\n<p>As well, the strategy fails to explicitly address the systemic issue of restricting personal liberty through imprisonment and pretrial detention for expressing opinions, particularly on social media. Journalists, media professionals, and citizens continue to face security prosecution, arrests, and prison sentences for sharing personal views on their own pages. Many also endure pretrial detention periods that exceed legal limits\u2014a practice that effectively strips the announced guarantees and recommendations of their actual substance. Reports by AFTE over the past four years consistently indicate the persistence of security and judicial prosecutions linked to freedom of expression.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Furthermore, the strategy fails to address the monopolistic practices prevailing across various media outlets, including newspapers, television channels, and other forms of creative production. This is evident in the concentration of ownership in the hands of certain companies reportedly affiliated with sovereign entities, which has facilitated centralized control over media content, the shaping of public narratives, and the marginalization of dissenting or non-conforming viewpoints. Such dynamics ultimately run counter to the core principles of media freedom and pluralism.<\/p>\n<p>Additionally, the strategy overlooks the right to privacy, particularly digital privacy and the associated practices of electronic surveillance and interception of private communications. Such practices undermine the safe space for expression within the digital sphere, despite the strategy\u2019s provision for &#8216;amending the Criminal Procedure Code to ensure the enforcement of the constitutional commitment to protect the sanctity of the private life of victims, witnesses, defendants, and whistleblowers.&#8217;<\/p>\n<p>Regarding cultural rights, the strategy stipulates &#8216;developing legislation related to the protection of intellectual property and competitiveness to create an enabling environment for cultural industries and raising awareness of the importance of intellectual property protection.&#8217;\u00a0 However, it makes no reference to freedom of artistic or cultural expression. This omission is evident, for example, in the absence of any proposed legislative amendments aimed at limiting the role of professional artistic syndicates in imposing restrictions on artistic expression or constraining creators at various levels. As a result, there are no clear guarantees to protect creators or provide opportunities for amateur artistic production, nor are there provisions ensuring freedom of artistic expression within official events and institutions. This negatively impacts public cultural policies and allows for the continuation of exclusionary or restrictive practices without clear human rights-based safeguards. Furthermore, the strategy omits any mention of the freedom to express religious beliefs, leaving entire domains of expression outside the scope of explicit protection.<\/p>\n<p>Under the pillar of economic and social rights, the shortcomings are even more evident regarding academic freedom. The strategy lacks any provision recognizing academic freedom as a fundamental pillar for the quality of education, nor does it refer to university autonomy in managing academic and administrative affairs in accordance with scientific standards. It similarly does not address the necessity of neutralizing the interference of the executive branch and security apparatuses in academic and administrative matters. There is also a notable absence of any mention of students&#8217; rights to organize and express their opinions, despite their direct link to fostering creative thinking and developing a culture of innovation, a gap that fundamentally contradicts the development goals proclaimed by the strategy.<\/p>\n<p>In the third pillar, concerning Vulnerable Groups, the strategy fails to specifically address the protection of women\u2019s right to freedom of expression. Since 2019, women have been subjected to continuous campaigns of security and judicial targeting under the pretext of &#8216;violating Egyptian family and societal values.&#8217; This oversight necessitates specific guarantees and recommendations that address the discriminatory nature of these practices. Furthermore, there is a clear lack of linkage between the political empowerment of youth and the assurance of their freedoms within universities and educational institutions, including their rights of participation, organization, and expression.<\/p>\n<p>In general, a comprehensive reading of the strategy\u2019s pillars regarding freedom of expression reveals a focus on broad, rhetorical perspectives. The strategy reflects a systematic disregard for the specific legislative and institutional reforms that constitute the core of the restrictions and violations against the right to freedom of expression and access to information. In other words, the strategy serves more as a general guiding framework than a clear reform plan; it lacks specific performance indicators and a transparent timeline. This raises serious questions about its capacity to bring about tangible changes or improvements in the reality of freedom of expression across its various forms: digital, media, creative, and academic.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong><span style=\"color: #800000;\">The National Strategy as a nominal Framework: A Reading into the Commitment- Implementation Gap<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The launch of a human rights strategy cannot be considered an achievement in itself unless it is coupled with a clear implementation plan and specific, measurable mechanisms; without these standards, the strategy remains a mere nominal or promotional document. While some progress has been made in certain areas, such as expanding opportunities for women in senior judicial and executive positions, these developments have coincided with persistent patterns of violations, particularly regarding freedom of thought and expression. These include the arrest of content creators and journalists, the restriction of media freedoms, and the prolonged pretrial detention of prisoners of conscience. Furthermore, the strategy has not been translated into substantive policies or legislation that reflect its stated principles. For instance, the Anti-Cybercrime Law, with its broad and vague provisions, continues to be used to prosecute content creators, while the Counter-Terrorism Law is employed against journalists, alongside the systemic use of extended pretrial detention in expression-related cases. Such practices diminish the impact of the strategy\u2019s minor gains and keep its overall efficacy under constant scrutiny. <a href=\"#_ftn17\" name=\"_ftnref17\"><sup>[17]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>In this regard, executive reports issued by the Supreme Standing Committee for Human Rights (SSCHR) highlight achievements made by the government across various human rights sectors. For instance, the Third Executive Report, covering the period from September 2023 to August 2024, points to several significant developments. In the field of freedom of expression, these milestones purportedly included the holding of competitive and fair presidential elections, as well as the convening of extraordinary sessions of the National Dialogue to discuss economic conditions and current challenges, resulting in recommendations and measures consistent with the outcomes of its first session.<\/p>\n<p>The report states that the sessions addressed a range of issues, including inflation, public debt, investment, the State Ownership Policy, and social justice. Additionally, the Supreme Council for Media Regulation (SCMR) issued 78 new licenses to satellite channels, websites, and newspapers. This period also witnessed numerous peaceful vigils and demonstrations organized by political parties, journalists, lawyers, and citizens to express views on various issues, such as solidarity with Palestine.<a href=\"#_ftn18\" name=\"_ftnref18\"><sup>[18]<\/sup><\/a> However, the positive image presented by the official report stands in stark contrast to the findings of AFTE, which documented systematic violations and ongoing restrictions on freedom of opinion and expression during the same period. <a href=\"#_ftn19\" name=\"_ftnref19\"><sup>[19]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<h4><span style=\"background-color: #800000; color: #ffffff;\"><strong>Section Three: Proposed Mechanisms for Translating UPR Recommendations into Policies on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information<\/strong><\/span><\/h4>\n<p>The Egyptian experience reveals a clear gap between international recommendations issued under UPR and actual national policies and practices. This gap is rooted in a complex set of connected political and institutional factors. While the Egyptian government has accepted or expressed support for a significant number of these recommendations, they often remain within the realm of general diplomatic pledges. These commitments are seldom translated into binding executive plans or tangible legislative reforms.<\/p>\n<p>This is partly due to the highly centralized nature of decision-making, where human rights issues are managed almost exclusively within the executive branch, with limited oversight and accountability roles for other institutions. Consequently, the Parliament\u2019s legislative role remains weak regarding the review of laws restricting freedom of expression or in promoting serious reform initiatives. Meanwhile, the judiciary does not always enjoy sufficient space to exercise effective oversight over pretrial detention practices or the administrative restrictions imposed on different spheres of expression, such as the media and the digital platforms.<\/p>\n<p>At the same time, independent civil society faces legal and procedural restrictions that limit its ability to participate in policy formulation or monitor the implementation of international obligations, thereby reducing opportunities for genuine societal dialogue on reform. As a result, international recommendations are transformed into a formal exercise geared more toward external image management than toward the restructuring of internal policies. Without the meaningful engagement of Parliament, the judiciary, and civil society as active and independent stakeholders in the decision-making cycle, these recommendations will remain subject to freezing or postponement, rather than serving as a starting point for genuine and sustainable institutional reform.\u00a0 <a href=\"#_ftn20\" name=\"_ftnref20\"><sup>[20]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>In this context, as the Supreme Standing Committee for Human Rights (SSCHR) works on drafting a new National Human Rights Strategy, it is crucial to link this national trajectory with the international obligations accepted by the Egyptian government, foremost among them being the recommendations from UPR. These recommendations are not merely general observations from the international community; they constitute political and ethical commitments that should be reflected in public policies, legislations, and executive practices. This linkage is particularly vital for the right to freedom of expression, which received a significant number of recommendations during Egypt\u2019s last UPR cycle. It remains a right that exhibits a significant gap between constitutional texts and international commitments on one hand, and actual practices on the ground on the other. Ultimately, the effectiveness of any National Human Rights Strategy is measured not by its theoretical comprehensiveness or eloquent drafting, but by its capacity to transform international recommendations into actionable public policies, clear mechanisms, and measurable indicators.<\/p>\n<p>Building on this, the implementation of these recommendations can be approached through a set of integrated reform pathways. These pathways are designed to transform the recommendations from general political commitments into actionable procedures that are subject to both implementation and monitoring.<\/p>\n<p><strong>\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span style=\"color: #800000;\"><strong>First Axis:<\/strong> <strong>Legislative Reform <\/strong><\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>The UPR recommendations relating to freedom of expression and access to information emphasize the necessity of aligning national legislation with Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). However, an effective response to these recommendations cannot be limited to reiterating constitutional guarantees. Rather, it requires a substantive review of the legislative framework used to restrict the right to expression\u2014whether in the fields of media regulation, digital expression, creativity, or academic freedom\u2014alongside the enactment of new laws that ensure the effective protection of this right. In this context, a comprehensive review of the following laws is imperative:<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>A comprehensive review of the Counter-Terrorism Law (No. 94 of 2015) is essential, as it remains one of the most frequently utilized statutes in cases involving freedom of opinion and expression due to its overly broad definitions and ambiguous provisions. In particular, Article 2 defines &#8216;terrorist acts&#8217; in an expansive manner that encompasses any action aimed at &#8216;disturbing public order&#8217; or &#8216;endangering social safety,&#8217; without establishing precise criteria to distinguish between actual violence and the peaceful exercise of rights. Articles 28 and 29 are also repeatedly invoked to prosecute journalists and social media users, serving as direct instruments for restricting freedom of expression and the access of information. <a href=\"#_ftn21\" name=\"_ftnref21\"><sup>[21]<\/sup><\/a>The danger of these provisions lies in their linkage of the legitimacy of expression solely to the official state narrative\u2014a clear violation of international standards, which affirm that freedom of expression inherently includes the right to criticize public policies and hold authorities accountable.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>A comprehensive review of the Anti-Cybercrime Law (No. 175 of 2018) is imperative, as it stands as one of the most significant legislative frameworks impacting freedom of expression in the digital sphere. Article 25, which criminalizes &#8216;violating Egyptian family values,&#8217; remains highly controversial due to the lack of a precise legal definition for &#8216;family values.&#8217; This ambiguity allows the provision to be exploited in prosecuting various forms of expressive content\u2014whether political, social, or cultural. Article 27 further penalizes anyone who creates or manages an electronic account with the intent to &#8216;commit a crime,&#8217; without requiring that the crime actually take place. This effectively criminalizes presumed intentions rather than tangible acts. Additionally, Article 7 grants investigative authorities the power to block websites under the pretext of &#8216;threatening national security or the national economy&#8217; without the necessity of a final judicial ruling. <a href=\"#_ftn22\" name=\"_ftnref22\"><sup>[22]<\/sup><\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Reviewing certain provisions in the Penal Code (No. 58 of 1937) is necessary, as they continue to be invoked in opinion-related cases despite their antiquity and inconsistency with modern constitutional and human rights developments. Article 80(d) is a primary example, criminalizing the dissemination of &#8216;false&#8217; news or data that could &#8216;harm national interests,&#8217; without providing a precise definition of what constitutes a national interest. Similarly, Article 102 (bis) penalizes the spreading of false news or rumors that might &#8216;disturb public peace&#8217;\u2014a provision widely utilized in freedom of expression cases. These articles are criticized for not requiring proof of actual, direct harm and for failing to distinguish between personal opinion and factual information. This contradicts international standards, which prohibit the criminalization of expression except under the narrowest circumstances and strictly according to the principles of necessity and proportionality.<a href=\"#_ftn23\" name=\"_ftnref23\"><sup>[23]<\/sup><\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Reviewing Law No. 180 of 2018 on the Regulation of Press and Media is crucial. Although the law ostensibly guarantees press freedom, it grants extensive powers to the Supreme Council for Media Regulation (SCMR), including the authority to impose administrative sanctions, block websites, suspend programs, and levy financial fines, all without sufficient safeguards for independence or immediate judicial oversight. The law also permits the blocking of websites in cases of &#8216;threatening national security,&#8217; yet it fails to provide a legal definition for this concept, leaving it open to broad and arbitrary interpretation. <a href=\"#_ftn24\" name=\"_ftnref24\"><sup>[24]<\/sup><\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Abolition of custodial penalties (prison sentences) in cases of publishing and expression across the Penal Code, the Anti-Cybercrime Law, Counter-Terrorism laws, and other relevant legislation is a fundamental necessity. Such penalties should be replaced exclusively with proportionate civil sanctions and measures.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Enacting access to information law, in alignment with Article (68) of the Egyptian Constitution and relevant international standards. This framework must stipulate the principle of disclosure as a general rule, with exceptions strictly defined, justified, and time-bound, to prevent the expansive withholding of information under vague pretexts of security or public order. It should also establish an independent mechanism to receive information requests and adjudicate grievances, while ensuring that government entities commit to the proactive disclosure of basic data. Enacting this law would enhance transparency and public accountability, and enable journalists, researchers, and civil society to perform their oversight role effectively.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>The issuance of a comprehensive Witness and Whistleblower Protection Act that guarantees their protection from any retaliatory measures, or legal and administrative prosecutions, resulting from reporting incidents of corruption or violations. This law should provide secure and confidential reporting mechanisms, thereby enhancing transparency and fostering an environment that supports freedom of expression and the access of information.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Protecting the right to digital privacy and the confidentiality of correspondence through clear legal regulations that define surveillance cases, contingent upon a judicial order and for a limited duration, to ensure a safe space for digital expression. In this context, the Criminal Procedure Law published in the Official Gazette in November 2025<a href=\"#_ftn25\" name=\"_ftnref25\"><sup>[25]<\/sup><\/a> requires review, as it poses a serious threat to the right to privacy by granting law enforcement officials broad and arbitrary powers to monitor and intercept individuals&#8217; communications and online activities. For instance, Articles 79 and 80 grant investigative judges extensive powers to issue surveillance orders, and Article 117 grants the Public Prosecution powers to monitor digital communications for the first time without judicial oversight. Therefore, it is recommended to recalibrate these powers and restore the exclusive jurisdiction for issuing surveillance orders to the judiciary, while clearly defining the duration and purpose, to protect digital privacy.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Incorporating a specific and explicit definition of academic freedom into the Universities Regulation Law and its executive regulations, encompassing the freedom to choose research topics and academic content, the freedom to publish without prior censorship, the freedom to participate in public debate, and protection from administrative, security, and judicial penalties or harassment based on scientific opinions.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Establishing a transparent and democratic electoral mechanism for selecting university presidents and academic leaders, ensuring the independence of university institutions from the executive branch and limiting external interference in their administrative affairs. This requires amending Article 25 of the Universities Regulation Law No. 49 of 1972, which stipulates: &#8220;The University President shall be appointed by a decree from the President of the Republic, based on the nomination of the Minister of Higher Education, from among three professors recommended by a specialized committee&#8230;&#8221; These amendments, which grant the President of the Republic the power to appoint university leaders, conflict with Article 21 of the Egyptian Constitution, which mandates the independence of universities.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Reviewing the amended Article 110 of the Universities Regulation Law, which stipulates that a faculty member may be dismissed in four cases, including participation in or incitement to violence and unrest within universities, or engaging in any partisan activities on campus. These provisions conflict with Article 74 of the Constitution, which affirms the right of citizens to form political parties. Furthermore, this article restricts the political and civil rights of university professors and limits their contribution to the political sphere, as well as their freedom of expression and participation in public life.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Revising the Student Bylaws approved in 2019 to ensure the protection of students&#8217; rights to run for office and participate in student unions, and to limit administrative arbitrariness against them. This includes establishing clear and transparent criteria for candidacy and participation in student unions based on the student&#8217;s academic qualifications and actual student activities, without the elastic use of phrases such as &#8220;good reputation&#8221; or &#8220;non-affiliation with a terrorist group,&#8221; which allow the university to exclude students for political or personal reasons. Additionally, an independent appeals mechanism should be established through which students can challenge any decisions of exclusion or disqualification from candidacy.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Ensuring the protection of artistic and cultural creativity by reviewing Article 5 of Law No. 35 of 1978, which regulates the syndicates of acting, cinematic, and musical professions. This article stipulates that no person may practice any of the artistic professions unless they are a registered member of the relevant syndicate or hold a temporary permit from it. This provision restricts the freedom of artistic creation and reinforces the authority of syndicates to control creative liberty.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Abolishing prior censorship on creativity by amending Articles 1, 2, and 9 of Law No. 430 of 1955 on the Regulation of Cinema Censorship. These articles grant censorship authorities absolute power over artistic and creative works. This reform is essential to align the law with Article 67 of the Egyptian Constitution.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Reviewing Article 178 of the Egyptian Penal Code (No. 58 of 1937), which penalizes anyone who &#8220;publishes, produces, or possesses with intent to trade, distribute, lease, paste, or display prints, manuscripts, drawings, advertisements, engraved or carved images, manual or photographic drawings, symbolic signs, or any other objects or images, if they are deemed offensive to public morals \u201coffensive to public decency.\u201d It is essential to abolish or amend the provisions that allow the prosecution of creators under the charge of &#8220;violating public morals,&#8221; in accordance with Article 67 of the Egyptian Constitution, which guarantees the freedom of artistic and cultural creativity.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Reviewing the legislative provisions commonly used to target women on the basis of their freedom of expression, such as Article 25 of the Anti-Cybercrime Law and Article 178 of the Egyptian Penal Code, as well as any other provisions related to &#8220;public morals&#8221; and similar broad charges frequently weaponized against women.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>In this context, it must be emphasized that the government&#8217;s genuine and effective response cannot be achieved without including an explicit commitment within the new National Strategy to review these specific provisions, rather than merely making general references to &#8220;aligning legislation.&#8221; Accordingly, incorporating specific article numbers and their contents into the Strategy\u2019s action plan is essential in order to transform political commitment into a measurable legislative reform process. This requires clearly identifying the provisions to be amended, the competent authorities responsible, and the anticipated timeline for implementation.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color: #800000;\"><strong>Second Axis: Public Policies<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p>Alongside legislative reform, protecting freedom of expression requires the adoption of clear public policies that foster an environment conducive to the actual exercise of this right. This includes;<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Adopting clear policies to ensure pluralism and prevent monopolistic practices in the media sector, including transparency in media ownership structures and funding sources. This includes preventing the concentration of ownership or the control of media institutions and creative production by executive or security entities, thereby ensuring media independence, diversity of opinions, and equal opportunities for access to the public sphere.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Lifting the block on news and press websites, subjecting any future blocking decisions to immediate judicial oversight, and requiring the Supreme Council for Media Regulation (SCMR) to commit to publishing periodic reports that detail the number of content blocking or removal decisions, along with their justifications and legal basis.<\/li>\n<li>The suspension of any administrative decisions that ban members of the LGBTQ+ community from appearing in the media and impose restrictions on the discussion of gender identity.<\/li>\n<li>proactive disclosure of information by public institutions, which is one of the most vital tools for supporting freedom of expression, to limit the monopoly on information and enhance public trust.<\/li>\n<li>The immediate cessation of unlawful mass surveillance practices, which includes halting the acquisition of mass surveillance technologies and dissolving the monitoring and analysis units within the Public Prosecution or security agencies that monitor and scan digital spaces to track citizens&#8217; opinions. The role of these entities should be strictly limited to investigating specific crimes based on formal reports or tangible evidence.<\/li>\n<li>Ending the monitoring of the personal social media accounts of employees in public institutions and universities, including halting the practice of tasking administrative departments and staff with the surveillance of employees&#8217; personal online activities.<\/li>\n<li>Terminating the authority of regulatory censorship bodies to delete scenes or ban artistic works from public screening by replacing prior control mechanisms with a clear age-classification framework, including the adoption of internationally recognized rating standards. This involves amending administrative procedures for creators, whereby they are only required to notify the regulatory body of the filming or screening date. The body must then classify the work according to age groups within a specified timeframe; if this period expires, the work is automatically classified for &#8220;General Audiences.&#8221; Furthermore, the regulatory body must be mandated to publish the justifications for the &#8220;age rating&#8221; granted to each work on its official website.<\/li>\n<li>Adopting objective and publicly available criteria for selecting participants in official festivals, cultural events, and state-affiliated cultural institutions. These criteria should be issued by the Ministry of Culture through a binding and published administrative decree, formulating measurable standards such as artistic quality and innovation, while avoiding vague phrases like &#8220;suitability for public taste.&#8221; This is to prevent the exclusion of creators or amateurs based on the content of their work or their intellectual orientations.<\/li>\n<li>Establishing clear procedural safeguards to protect faculty members from arbitrary dismissal on the basis of exercise of their civil and political rights, such as political activity, participation in the public sphere, and freedom of expression. Such safeguards should include limiting disciplinary accountability solely to acts related to academic and administrative violations within the university campus; ensuring that no investigation is opened except through a reasoned, written decision outlining specific facts and evidence; prohibiting reliance on secret security reports while enabling faculty members to access and challenge any reports; and forming independent investigative committees composed of elected, rather than appointed, faculty members.<\/li>\n<li>Accreditation and evaluation of academic theses based on purely scientific criteria, while prohibiting the removal or rejection of research for political reasons. Disputes related to scientific research must be resolved through academic committees to strengthen university independence and protect its role as a space for free knowledge and rigorous intellectual debate.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span style=\"color: #800000;\"><strong>Third Axis: Rule of Law<\/strong><\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Several recommendations in UPR addressed the Egyptian authorities&#8217; practices and violations of laws that are supposed to guarantee freedom of expression and the access of information. Most notably, the systematic use of pretrial detention as a penalty against anyone who peacefully expresses their opinion in a manner that contradicts the official state narrative. Despite the constitutional guarantees for freedom of opinion and expression, the fundamental dilemma in the Egyptian context remains largely tied to executive practices and violations that contravene the legislative texts themselves.<\/p>\n<p>In this regard, pretrial detention has shifted from a precautionary legal measure with specific regulations and safeguards into a punitive tool widely used in freedom of expression cases whether in the context of digital expression on the internet and social media, media and journalism, artistic creativity, or academic and student freedoms. The practice of &#8220;Rotation&#8221; (Tadweer) stands out as a primary method of circumventing the maximum legal limits for pretrial detention, effectively leading to open-ended detention that contradicts Article (143) of the Criminal Procedure Code.<a href=\"#_ftn26\" name=\"_ftnref26\"><sup>[26]<\/sup><\/a> Accordingly, the following measures should be adopted:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Releasing all individuals held in pretrial detention in cases related to freedom of expression, and ceasing the use of pretrial detention in cases involving peaceful expression<\/li>\n<li>Prohibit the rotation of defendants into new cases based on the same facts, and mandate that investigative authorities provide reasoned justifications for detention renewal decisions.<\/li>\n<li>Suspend criminal prosecution against journalists and content creators based on their professional work, and end the prosecution of women that is driven by discrimination and on moral grounds.<\/li>\n<li>Ensuring that all executive procedures are subject to effective judicial oversight that guarantees respect for constitutional safeguards and Egypt\u2019s international obligations.<\/li>\n<li>Abolishing the requirement for prior security approval for the travel of faculty members, as the University Regulation Law contains no provisions authorizing security interference in academic work. Adherence to the law would ensure that faculty members are able to participate in international research programs and engage in knowledge exchange and scientific debate with their peers.<\/li>\n<li>Prohibiting all forms of censorship on scientific and academic research by banning security interference in research topics or the content of the teaching process, as such interventions contravene the provisions of the University Regulation Law.<\/li>\n<li>Ceasing the requirement for security clearances or background checks not stipulated by law as a condition for granting permits to hold artistic events and festivals, and limiting licensing procedures to the competent administrative bodies according to written and public criteria. It should also be prohibited to cancel or suspend events on grounds not explicitly defined by law or without a reasoned and publicly disclosed decision.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color: #ffffff; background-color: #800000;\"><strong>Conclusion<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p>UPR is one of the most significant United Nations mechanisms for highlighting human rights conditions periodically and comprehensively. However, the mere acceptance of recommendations or their inclusion in official documents does not necessarily mean they are effective or realized. In this regard, follow-up and accountability mechanisms are among the most complex and critical issues, as the deficiency is not limited to the content of policies but extends to the absence of a clear institutional framework that ensures the independent and transparent implementation and monitoring of these recommendations.<\/p>\n<p>To date, the follow-up and accountability process relies predominantly on government self-assessment, lacking an independent mechanism or body to evaluate these policies and engage diverse stakeholders, such as civil society, whether in designing evaluation tools or accessing implementation results. Furthermore, there is a lack of linkage between each recommendation and the specific entity responsible for its execution, leading to overlapping jurisdictions and making it difficult to hold any particular body accountable for delays or non-implementation. Additionally, there are no specific performance indicators or announced timelines. Consequently, these commitments are transformed into what resemble mere formal pledges.<\/p>\n<p>In this context, the National Strategy for Human Rights represents a genuine opportunity to restructure the implementation process, provided that mechanisms are established to prevent the recurrence of previous national action plans that lacked clear execution benchmarks. This requires the preparation of an official matrix that links each recommendation to a specific executive action, a responsible entity, and a public timeline, while publishing periodic follow-up reports that reflect accurate data on progress made. As well, it is necessary to empower Parliament to exercise its oversight role by reviewing legislation that restricts freedom of thought and expression and holding periodic hearing sessions to hold the government accountable for the implementation of accepted recommendations.<\/p>\n<p>Finally, the activation of these mechanisms should be viewed as a gateway to enhancing the state&#8217;s credibility and its international commitments, rather than treated as an administrative burden. The Egyptian government must integrate the proposals of human rights organizations into national plans and the public policies it adopts, instead of focusing on broad titles such as raising awareness and disseminating knowledge.<\/p>\n<pre><a href=\"#_ftnref1\" name=\"_ftn1\">[1]<\/a> \"Universal Periodic Review\", Human Rights Council, United Nations, accessed January 31, 2026, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/ar\/hr-bodies\/upr\/upr-home\">https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/ar\/hr-bodies\/upr\/upr-home<\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref2\" name=\"_ftn2\">[2]<\/a> \u201cUniversal Periodic Review \u2013 Egypt\u201d, Human Rights Council, United Nations, accessed on 31 January 2026, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/en\/hr-bodies\/upr\/eg-index\">https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/en\/hr-bodies\/upr\/eg-index<\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref3\" name=\"_ftn3\">[3]<\/a> \u201cReport of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review\u201d, Human Rights Council, United Nations, June 13, 2025, accessed January 31, 2026, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/sites\/default\/files\/documents\/hrbodies\/upr\/sessions\/session48\/egy\/a-hrc-59-16-add.1-av-egypt-a.pdf\">https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/sites\/default\/files\/documents\/hrbodies\/upr\/sessions\/session48\/egy\/a-hrc-59-16-add.1-av-egypt-a.pdf<\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref4\" name=\"_ftn4\">[4]<\/a> \u201cUniversal Declaration of Human Rights\u201d, United Nations, accessed January 31, 2026, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.un.org\/en\/about-us\/universal-declaration-of-human-rights\">https:\/\/www.un.org\/en\/about-us\/universal-declaration-of-human-rights<\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref5\" name=\"_ftn5\">[5]<\/a> \u201cInternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights\u201d, United Nations, accessed January 31, 2026, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/en\/instruments-mechanisms\/instruments\/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights\">https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/en\/instruments-mechanisms\/instruments\/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights<\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref6\" name=\"_ftn6\">[6]<\/a> \u201cAfrican Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights\u201d, Human Rights Library, University of Minnesota, accessed January 31, 2026, <a href=\"https:\/\/hrlibrary.umn.edu\/arab\/a005.html\">https:\/\/hrlibrary.umn.edu\/arab\/a005.html<\/a>\r\n\r\n\u201cDeclaration on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Defenders\u201d, United Nations, accessed January 31, 2026, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/en\/civic-space\/declaration-human-rights-defenders\">https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/en\/civic-space\/declaration-human-rights-defenders<\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref7\" name=\"_ftn7\">[7]<\/a> \u201cReport of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review\u201d, Human Rights Council, United Nations, April 1, 2025, accessed January 31, 2026, <a href=\"https:\/\/docs.un.org\/ar\/A\/HRC\/59\/16\">https:\/\/docs.un.org\/ar\/A\/HRC\/59\/16<\/a>\r\n\r\n\u00a0\u201cReport of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review\u201d, June 13, 2025, op. cit.\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref8\" name=\"_ftn8\">[8]<\/a> \u201cReport of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review,\u201d June 13, 2025, op. cit.\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref9\" name=\"_ftn9\">[9]<\/a> \u201cLaunching the National Strategy for Human Rights,\u201d Human Rights Studies, accessed January 31, 2026,\r\n\r\n<a href=\"https:\/\/hrightsstudies.sis.gov.eg\/%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%88%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1\/%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1\/%D8%A5%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%88%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%86\/\">https:\/\/hrightsstudies.sis.gov.eg\/%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%88%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1\/%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1\/%D8%A5%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%88%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%86\/<\/a>\r\n\r\n\u201cPresident Abdel Fattah El-Sisi Launches the National Strategy for Human Rights,\" The Presidency, September 11, 2021, accessed February 11, 2026,\r\n\r\n<a href=\"https:\/\/www.presidency.eg\/ar\/%D9%82%D8%B3%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1\/%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D8%A6%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9\/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%AD-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B7%D9%84%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%88%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%86-1192021\/\">https:\/\/www.presidency.eg\/ar\/%D9%82%D8%B3%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1\/%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D8%A6%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9\/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%AD-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B7%D9%84%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%88%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%86-1192021\/<\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref10\" name=\"_ftn10\">[10]<\/a> \u201cDrying Up the Sources of Freedom: From the Streets to the Internet \u2013 Annual Report on the State of Freedom of Expression in Egypt 2021,\u201d Association for Freedom of Thought and Expression (AFTE), February 22, 2022, accessed January 31, 2026, <a href=\"https:\/\/afteegypt.org\/research\/monitoring-reports\/2022\/02\/22\/29120-afteegypt.html\">https:\/\/afteegypt.org\/research\/monitoring-reports\/2022\/02\/22\/29120-afteegypt.html<\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref11\" name=\"_ftn11\">[11]<\/a> \u201cPrime Minister Decree No. 2396 of 2018 Establishing the Supreme Standing Committee for Human Rights,\u201d Manshurat Qanuniya, accessed February 11, 2026, <a href=\"https:\/\/manshurat.org\/node\/47399\">https:\/\/manshurat.org\/node\/47399<\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref12\" name=\"_ftn12\">[12]<\/a> Ibid.\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref13\" name=\"_ftn13\">[13]<\/a> \u201cFirst Meeting of the Supreme Standing Committee for Human Rights Held,\u201d El Watan, July 1, 2020, accessed February 11, 2026, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.elwatannews.com\/news\/details\/4882914\">https:\/\/www.elwatannews.com\/news\/details\/4882914<\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref14\" name=\"_ftn14\">[14]<\/a> Mohamed Ashraf, \u201cThe National Human Rights Strategy in Egypt: Whitewashing the Regime\u2019s Image or a Genuine Desire for Change?,\u201d Raseef22, September 15, 2021, accessed January 29, 2026,\r\n\r\n<a href=\"https:\/\/raseef22.net\/article\/1084417-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%88%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%84-%D9%84%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A3%D9%85-%D8%B1%D8%BA%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%BA%D9%8A%D9%8A%D8%B1\">https:\/\/raseef22.net\/article\/1084417-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%88%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%84-%D9%84%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A3%D9%85-%D8%B1%D8%BA%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%BA%D9%8A%D9%8A%D8%B1<\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref15\" name=\"_ftn15\">[15]<\/a> Mohamed El-Jali, \u201cPresident El-Sisi Directs the Preparation for a New Human Rights Strategy,\u201d Youm7, September 30, 2025, accessed January 29, 2026,\r\n\r\n<a href=\"https:\/\/www.youm7.com\/story\/2025\/9\/30\/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B3%D9%89-%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%87-%D8%A8%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%A1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%88%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%86\/7139473\">https:\/\/www.youm7.com\/story\/2025\/9\/30\/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B3%D9%89-%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%87-%D8%A8%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%A1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%88%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%86\/7139473<\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref16\" name=\"_ftn16\">[16]<\/a> \u201cNational Strategy for Human Rights (2021\u20132026),\u201d Supreme Standing Committee for Human Rights (SSCHR).\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref17\" name=\"_ftn17\">[17]<\/a> Shaima Hamdi, \u201cWhat Has Changed Four Years After the Launch of the National Human Rights Strategy?,\u201d Zawia3, November 6, 2025, accessed January 29, 2026, <a href=\"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/national-human-rights-strategy\/\">https:\/\/zawia3.com\/national-human-rights-strategy\/<\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref18\" name=\"_ftn18\">[18]<\/a> \u201cThe National Strategy for Human Rights: Third Year of Implementation,\u201d Supreme Standing Committee for Human Rights (SSCHR), accessed February 1, 2026, <a href=\"https:\/\/hrightsstudies.sis.gov.eg\/media\/28793\/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%88%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7-%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%86-ar.pdf\">https:\/\/hrightsstudies.sis.gov.eg\/media\/28793\/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%88%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7-%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%86-ar.pdf<\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref19\" name=\"_ftn19\">[19]<\/a> \u201cSilencing Egyptians in the New Republic: Annual Report on the State of Freedom of Expression in Egypt 2023,\u201d Association for Freedom of Thought and Expression (AFTE), May 26, 2024;\r\n\r\n<a href=\"https:\/\/afteegypt.org\/research\/2024\/05\/26\/37391-afteegypt.html\">https:\/\/afteegypt.org\/research\/2024\/05\/26\/37391-afteegypt.html<\/a>\r\n\r\nsee also AFTE\u2019s quarterly reports for 2024 (Q1, Q2, and Q3), accessed February 1, 2026,\r\n\r\n<a href=\"https:\/\/afteegypt.org\/research\/2024\/06\/04\/37474-afteegypt.html\">https:\/\/afteegypt.org\/research\/2024\/06\/04\/37474-afteegypt.html<\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"https:\/\/afteegypt.org\/research\/monitoring-reports\/2024\/07\/24\/37834-afteegypt.html\">https:\/\/afteegypt.org\/research\/monitoring-reports\/2024\/07\/24\/37834-afteegypt.html<\/a>\u00a0\r\n\r\n<a href=\"https:\/\/afteegypt.org\/research\/monitoring-reports\/2024\/12\/15\/39148-afteegypt.html\">https:\/\/afteegypt.org\/research\/monitoring-reports\/2024\/12\/15\/39148-afteegypt.html<\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref20\" name=\"_ftn20\">[20]<\/a> \u201cEgypt: UN Review Spotlights Key Rights Concerns,\u201d Human Rights Watch, January 31, 2025;\r\n<a href=\"https:\/\/www.hrw.org\/ar\/news\/2025\/01\/31\/egypt-un-review-spotlights-key-rights-concerns\">https:\/\/www.hrw.org\/ar\/news\/2025\/01\/31\/egypt-un-review-spotlights-key-rights-concerns<\/a>\r\n\r\n\u201cFrom Commitment to Implementation? A Comparative Analytical Reading of Egypt\u2019s Universal Periodic Review (UPR) 2019\u20132025\u201d, National Association for the Defense of Rights and Freedoms, 9 July 2025, accessed on 1 February 2026,\r\n\r\n<a href=\"https:\/\/nadrf-eg.org\/from-commitment-to-implementation-a-comparative-analytical-reading-of-egypts-universal-periodic-review-upr-2019-2025\/\">https:\/\/nadrf-eg.org\/from-commitment-to-implementation-a-comparative-analytical-reading-of-egypts-universal-periodic-review-upr-2019-2025\/<\/a>\r\n\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref21\" name=\"_ftn21\">[21]<\/a> \u201cCounter-Terrorism Law No. 94 of 2015,\u201d Manshurat Qanuniyah (Legal Publications), accessed February 1, 2026, <a href=\"https:\/\/manshurat.org\/node\/6573\">https:\/\/manshurat.org\/node\/6573<\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref22\" name=\"_ftn22\">[22]<\/a> \u201cAnti-Cybercrime Law No. 175 of 2018,\u201d Manshurat Qanuniyah (Legal Publications), accessed February 1, 2026, <a href=\"https:\/\/manshurat.org\/node\/31487\">https:\/\/manshurat.org\/node\/31487<\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref23\" name=\"_ftn23\">[23]<\/a> \u201cPenal Code No. 58 of 1937,\u201d Manshurat Qanuniyah (Legal Publications), accessed February 1, 2026, <a href=\"https:\/\/manshurat.org\/node\/14677\">https:\/\/manshurat.org\/node\/14677<\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref24\" name=\"_ftn24\">[24]<\/a> \u201cLaw No. 180 of 2018 on the Regulation of Press and Media and the Supreme Council for Media Regulation,\u201d Manshurat Qanuniyah (Legal Publications), accessed February 1, 2026, <a href=\"https:\/\/manshurat.org\/node\/31481\">https:\/\/manshurat.org\/node\/31481<\/a>\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref25\" name=\"_ftn25\">[25]<\/a> \u201cLaw No. 174 of 2025 Enacting the Criminal Procedure Law,\u201d Official Gazette, Issue No. 45 bis (d), November 12, 2025, accessed February 12, 2026,\r\n\r\n<a href=\"https:\/\/hrightsstudies.sis.gov.eg\/media\/30130\/%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86_%D8%B1%D9%82%D9%85_174_%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%86%D8%A9_2025_%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1_%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1%D8%A7%D8%AA_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%A9_%D9%A1.pdf\">https:\/\/hrightsstudies.sis.gov.eg\/media\/30130\/%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86_%D8%B1%D9%82%D9%85_174_%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%86%D8%A9_2025_%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1_%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1%D8%A7%D8%AA_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%A9_%D9%A1.pdf<\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref26\" name=\"_ftn26\">[26]<\/a> \"Criminal Procedure Code No. 150 of 1950,\" Manshurat Qanuniyah (Legal Publications), accessed February 1, 2026, <a href=\"https:\/\/manshurat.org\/node\/14676\">https:\/\/manshurat.org\/node\/14676<\/a><\/pre>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Contents Methodology\u00a0 Introduction\u00a0 Section 1: Freedom of Expression and Access to Information within the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) Framework. Section 2: Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in the National Human Rights Strategy Section 3: Proposed Mechanisms for Translating UPR Recommendations into Policies on the File of Freedom of Expression and Access to Information [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":88,"featured_media":40224,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[968,970],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-40223","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-research-en","category-research-papers-en"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v26.1.1 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/wordpress\/plugins\/seo\/ -->\n<title>The Implementation Gap: Freedom of Expression Between International Recommendations and Public Policy in Egypt - Association of Freedom of Thought and Expression<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/afteegypt.org\/en\/research-en\/2026\/03\/05\/40223-afteegypt.html\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"The Implementation Gap: Freedom of Expression Between International Recommendations and Public Policy in Egypt - Association of Freedom of Thought and Expression\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Contents Methodology\u00a0 Introduction\u00a0 Section 1: Freedom of Expression and Access to Information within the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) Framework. Section 2: Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in the National Human Rights Strategy Section 3: Proposed Mechanisms for Translating UPR Recommendations into Policies on the File of Freedom of Expression and Access to Information [&hellip;]\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/afteegypt.org\/en\/research-en\/2026\/03\/05\/40223-afteegypt.html\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Association of Freedom of Thought and Expression\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2026-03-05T09:53:33+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/afteegypt.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/The-Implementation-Gap.jpg\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"928\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"515\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"somaya magdy\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"somaya magdy\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"39 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/afteegypt.org\/en\/research-en\/2026\/03\/05\/40223-afteegypt.html\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/afteegypt.org\/en\/research-en\/2026\/03\/05\/40223-afteegypt.html\",\"name\":\"The Implementation Gap: Freedom of Expression Between International Recommendations and Public Policy in Egypt - 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