{"id":41498,"date":"2026-07-03T14:55:29","date_gmt":"2026-07-03T11:55:29","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/afteegypt.org\/?p=41498"},"modified":"2026-07-03T15:10:48","modified_gmt":"2026-07-03T12:10:48","slug":"41498","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/afteegypt.org\/en\/research-en\/2026\/07\/03\/41498-afteegypt.html","title":{"rendered":"An Assessment of Artificial Intelligence Strategies in Egypt: Between Challenges and Aspirations"},"content":{"rendered":"<h4><strong><span style=\"color: #800000;\">Contents<\/span> <\/strong><\/h4>\n<p><strong>Methodology<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Introduction <\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Section One: AI Governance: Technical Specifics and Challenges of Prioritisation and Regulation Worldwide<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Section Two: The National Artificial Intelligence Strategy: Between Reality and Aspirations<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Conclusion and Recommendations <\/strong><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<h4><strong><span style=\"color: #800000;\">Methodology<\/span> <\/strong><\/h4>\n<p>In its analysis and assessment, the paper drew on a desk review of a number of international reference frameworks on the governance of artificial intelligence, in particular the international outputs issued by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as the lead coordinator and supporter of governments\u2019 efforts worldwide to adopt artificial intelligence technologies. These frameworks included the OECD\u2019s outputs on the application of artificial intelligence (AI) within the scope of government work \u2013 which is the main objective of Egypt\u2019s National AI Strategy \u2013 and which, in turn, were based on a survey of experiences in applying artificial intelligence in government services worldwide, and an evaluation of these applications.<\/p>\n<p>The paper also based its assessment on the OECD\u2019s recommendations on responsible and trustworthy artificial intelligence (Principles of Trustworthy AI). Furthermore, the paper drew upon another reference framework: the European Union\u2019s Artificial Intelligence Act (EU Regulation 1689\/2024), This choice was made because it is, to date, the most comprehensive and integrated regulatory framework globally, having been enacted as legislation designed to promote the adoption of artificial intelligence technologies whilst protecting citizens\u2019 personal data and upholding human rights and fundamental freedoms.<\/p>\n<p>The paper also drew on a review of public policy studies in the field of artificial intelligence regulation worldwide, examining the challenges they raise and the lessons learnt from various governance experiences around the world. Furthermore, the paper surveyed and analysed relevant Egyptian national frameworks relating to artificial intelligence, such as the National AI Strategy (in its first and second editions), the National Guidelines for Generative AI, and the Egyptian Code of Ethics for Responsible Artificial Intelligence. The analysis and evaluation also drew on other frameworks that complement the AI agenda within the telecommunications and information technology regulatory sector, such as the Digital Egypt Strategy, the Cloud Computing Strategy, the Open Source Software Strategy, and the Open Data Strategy, as well as a review of the outputs and efforts of the Egyptian Centre for Artificial Intelligence in implementing and reviewing the National AI Strategy.<\/p>\n<p><strong>\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n<h4><span style=\"color: #800000;\"><strong>Introduction<\/strong><\/span><\/h4>\n<p>AI is attracting growing attention both globally and in Egypt, given the rapid development of this technology, the increasing reliance on it across a wide range of sectors, and the huge returns this sector is expected to generate. The Egyptian government began to take an institutional interest in AI by launching the National Council for AI in 2019, followed by the publication of the first version of the AI Strategy in 2021, with a second version due in 2025. This was followed by attempts to draw up proposed guidelines for dealing with AI in Egypt, the most recent of which were the National Guidelines for Generative AI in March 2026. In parallel, a number of draft bills have been proposed by members of parliament to regulate and govern AI in Egypt<a href=\"#_ftn1\" name=\"_ftnref1\"><sup>[1]<\/sup><\/a> , whilst the government is also working on drafting a similar bill.<a href=\"#_ftn2\" name=\"_ftnref2\"><sup>[2]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>This paper aims to contribute to the ongoing discussions on public policy for the regulation of the AI sector, and the associated protection of digital rights, the right to privacy and the guarantee of the free flow of information. To this end, the paper examines the National AI Strategy \u2013 in both its versions \u2013 and related guiding frameworks such as the Guidelines for the Regulation of Generative AI and the Egyptian Code of Ethics for Responsible AI. This requires an understanding of the legal and regulatory treatment of AI, within the context of Egypt\u2019s communications and information infrastructure, the nature of the proposed technologies, and the target sectors.<\/p>\n<p>The paper based its assessment on the findings and recommendations of the OECD regarding the governance of AI, particularly in government work. The most significant and recent of these was a publication titled \u201cGoverning with AI\u201d in 2025, which drew on a survey of 200 AI adoption cases across 12 government sectors in various countries.<a href=\"#_ftn3\" name=\"_ftnref3\"><sup>[3]<\/sup><\/a> This publication is notable for its focus on monitoring and analysing the efforts of governments worldwide; in producing it, and in highlighting the lessons learnt from these implementation experiences, the OECD drew on information provided by the governments themselves. This edition forms part of a wider project sponsored by the organisation, entitled \u2018Governing AI\u2019, which aims to support governments in adopting AI in a responsible and secure manner. The report also drew on policy papers prepared by independent researchers for the OECD\u2019s AI Policy Observatory, which address the challenges of adopting AI in the delivery of public services. The paper also addresses the OECD\u2019s recommendations, known as the \u2018Principles of Trustworthy AI\u2019<a href=\"#_ftn4\" name=\"_ftnref4\"><sup>[4]<\/sup><\/a> , and the European Union\u2019s AI Governance Regulation1689\/2024<a href=\"#_ftn5\" name=\"_ftnref5\"><sup>[5]<\/sup><\/a>. The EU Regulation is relied upon as the primary benchmark for measurement and assessment because it is the most comprehensive and binding international framework for the regulation of AI.<\/p>\n<p>This framework is also characterised by its emphasis on the centrality of fundamental freedoms and democracy, including the protection of personal data, privacy and digital security for users, and ensuring they are fully informed about how their data is collected and used. Furthermore, the EU\u2019s regulatory frameworks place significant and detailed emphasis on a risk-assessment approach in the regulatory documents following the AI Act, which have categorised the types of risks anticipated from the use of AI, in which areas, and classifying the severity of these risks \u2013 ranging from those that are intolerable to those falling into the high, medium and low categories \u2013 whilst setting out the legal consequences of each, providing real-world examples of risks, and specifying unacceptable practices on the part of service providers.<sup> <a href=\"#_ftn6\" name=\"_ftnref6\">[6]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<h4><span style=\"color: #800000;\"><strong>First: AI Governance: Technical Specifics, Prioritisation Challenges and Regulation Around the World<\/strong><\/span><\/h4>\n<p>The governance of AI poses a major challenge to national systems around the world, given the rapid pace of development of AI technologies \u2014 which is far outstripping legal and regulatory frameworks \u2014 as well as the varying levels of understanding amongst policymakers and decision-makers worldwide regarding how this technology works. Although regulating this technology is difficult, the risks associated with it necessitate regulation to mitigate those risks. One of the greatest challenges associated with regulating AI lies in clearly and definitively defining the term, which is a major point of contention,<a href=\"#_ftn7\" name=\"_ftnref7\"><sup>[7]<\/sup><\/a> ; however, what the various definitions have in common is that it is the process that makes machines more intelligent. The difficulty in defining it stems in part from the widespread confusion between AI on the one hand, and algorithms on the other; whilst AI is, in fact, merely a branch of algorithms.<a href=\"#_ftn8\" name=\"_ftnref8\"><sup>[8]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>AI governance encompasses a wide range of issues that require discussion, regulation and codification, whether in the form of laws or guiding frameworks; These include ethical considerations and practices that must be taken into account during regulation, as well as administrative and regulatory parameters concerning the actors involved in AI technologies, who are also part of the AI value chain \u2013 such as technology developers, governments and individual consumers\u2014 the limits of their responsibilities, the distribution of burdens amongst them, the nature of the sectors into which AI will be integrated, the resources required to implement these technologies, how their operation will be reviewed and monitored, and the criteria for determining the success of the technology\u2019s adoption.<\/p>\n<p>Although there are numerous issues that must be addressed and positions taken on when considering an integrated framework for the governance of AI, as outlined above, it is notable that ethical standards and the management of risks arising from the use of AI dominate the discussions. This is due to the prevailing fears and doubts amongst the public and those concerned with issues of rights and freedoms regarding the consequences of adopting AI in an unregulated and irresponsible manner, which may lead to the violation of the personal rights of individuals and groups, as well as threatening their economic rights, in addition to the significant economic and financial losses that may result from adopting this technology without the capacity to address its errors and contain the associated risks.<a href=\"#_ftn9\" name=\"_ftnref9\"><sup>[9]<\/sup><\/a> These concerns are inextricably linked to issues of trust in the governments and entities responsible for implementing AI applications, which further exacerbate these fears.<\/p>\n<p>Attempts to govern AI vary amongst the initiatives put forward by governments around the world, in what are known as national AI governance strategies, which specifically set out the objectives of adopting such strategies in a given country, as well as the expected commitments,<a href=\"#_ftn10\" name=\"_ftnref10\"><sup>[10]<\/sup><\/a> Other regulatory efforts take the form of laws and legislation governing AI, as well as guidelines and recommendations from international organisations such as UNESCO and the OECD, designed to assist governments in finding the optimal approach to governance. In addition, public policy and legal experts are proposing governance approaches aimed at maximising benefits and minimising risks.<\/p>\n<p>The fact that these frameworks are mentioned does not imply that they are entirely separate; rather, this review aims to highlight the technical complexity and the current state of attempts to regulate AI, which are still in a phase of trial and error; It also aims to highlight the gap between the overarching objectives and the principles that must be observed (such as non-bias, digital security and privacy), on the one hand, and the difficulty of technically implementing these principles, on the other.<\/p>\n<p>Various approaches to the governance of AI have been put forward by public policy experts and legal scholars, and these vary according to the specific constraints and priorities of each system. For example, approaches and systems of adaptive AI governance have emerged<a href=\"#_ftn11\" name=\"_ftnref11\"><sup>[11]<\/sup><\/a>, which are centred on the principle of not restricting creativity and innovation in AI technology. This is achieved by ensuring flexibility and a rapid response to changes and emergencies that arise during its use, without being constrained by the need for prior orders for intervention and remediation from official regulatory bodies.<\/p>\n<p>There is also an approach that runs counter to adaptive governance: centralised governance systems, which are underpinned by a fear that companies will dominate the management and direction of technology in a way that primarily reflects their own interests. Consequently, this system seeks to ensure that governments centrally manage and steer AI technology, thereby preventing corporate misdirection that could harm the interests of consumer groups. A middle ground between the two systems is what is known as hybrid\/decentralised AI governance<a href=\"#_ftn12\" name=\"_ftnref12\"><sup>[12]<\/sup><\/a> , which seeks to ensure flexibility, allowing companies and AI developers to develop the technology and make continuous adjustments to it without the need for complex prior approvals, but in coordination with governments to keep them informed and to ensure transparency and accountability. This debate on governance systems is accompanied by calls to adopt an inclusive, participatory approach to AI governance, with the aim of reaching a societal consensus on which AI applications should be adopted, what the expected benefits and outcomes are, and how the burdens should be distributed amongst the various stakeholders.<a href=\"#_ftn13\" name=\"_ftnref13\"><sup>[13]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Compounding the difficulty of developing governance approaches for AI are the differing national priorities of governments, which drive their adoption of AI depending on the sectors in which they wish to apply the technology, or in accordance with specific priorities and values. For example, some countries seek to gain a competitive advantage in specific areas by adopting AI technologies, such as in the armaments, defence and security sectors, or in other public services such as the health sector, particularly in countries facing labour shortages and ageing populations.<\/p>\n<p>Governments\u2019 value-based priorities also influence approaches to AI governance. Take the European Union, for example, which has framed its 2024 AI Regulation<a href=\"#_ftn14\" name=\"_ftnref14\"><sup>[14]<\/sup><\/a> around priorities such as the protection of personal data, the prevention of bias, and risk management \u2013 with all that this entails in terms of restrictions on AI providers and developers.<a href=\"#_ftn15\" name=\"_ftnref15\"><sup>[15]<\/sup><\/a> The EU\u2019s regulation of AI is characterised by its reliance on a pre-existing legislative framework, which sets out the ethical parameters for the operation of AI, such as the General Data Protection Regulation, which was enacted in 2016 and sets out data protection requirements that must be observed in AI applications, particularly in terms of fairness, transparency, accountability and privacy. Therefore, in practice \u2013 even though it does not explicitly mention AI \u2013 the law imposes restrictions on the use of AI to categorise individuals through what is known as \u2018profiling\u2019 based on their personal data, which paves the way for tracking them and making predictions about their future actions and behaviour. This could put them at risk of personal harm or discrimination, or lead to AI applications making formal decisions accordingly, whether in the form of recommendations or final decisions.<\/p>\n<p>These restrictions include regulatory and classification restrictions on personal data used during the database construction phases and the manner in which it is processed, depending on its level of sensitivity, as well as time limits on the maximum period for which individuals\u2019 personal data may be retained.<a href=\"#_ftn16\" name=\"_ftnref16\"><sup>[16]<\/sup><\/a> The AI Act has built upon this with detailed documents issued following its enactment, requiring applicants to disclose and publish the nature of the data on which they relied when training AI models, in both a technical format and a narrative format that is easy for the public to understand and monitor.<a href=\"#_ftn17\" name=\"_ftnref17\"><sup>[17]<\/sup><\/a> It also requires the documentation of all stages of data use by service developers and providers, thereby enabling accountability and audit. Furthermore, the European AI Act ensures that its provisions and subsequent implementing rules comply with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.<a href=\"#_ftn18\" name=\"_ftnref18\"><sup>[18]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>In contrast, the US tends towards a model of voluntary guidelines,<a href=\"#_ftn19\" name=\"_ftnref19\"><sup>[19]<\/sup><\/a> , which implicitly falls under the category of \u2018soft law approaches\u2019\u2014that is, non-binding techniques and rules.<a href=\"#_ftn20\" name=\"_ftnref20\"><sup>[20]<\/sup><\/a> This latter category includes calls for companies working in the field of AI to develop a set of guidelines autonomously and voluntarily, as a commitment to uphold these values, rather than resorting to formal legal regulation with all the burdens and restrictions it entails, which would slow down the development of AI technologies.<\/p>\n<p>The choice of an AI governance and management framework is also linked to the type of technology and applications to be adopted from the AI matrix, each of which has different management requirements. There is more than one type of AI, depending on its capabilities and the nature of the tasks it is expected to perform. In terms of capabilities, there is narrow or weak AI (Artificial Narrow\/Weak Intelligence), which refers to applications that are well-known amongst consumers \u2013 such as ChatGPT and OpenAI \u2013 which have a significant capacity to perform image and text recognition tasks. This is utilised to automate many repetitive tasks, meaning its outputs are predictable and known in advance; consequently, it cannot go beyond the tasks specified for it.<\/p>\n<p>Conversely, two other forms of AI are expected to develop: Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) and Super AI. Concerns are growing about these two forms \u2013 despite claims that they remain theoretical for the time being and have no practical applications \u2013<a href=\"#_ftn21\" name=\"_ftnref21\"><sup>[21]<\/sup><\/a> given their ability to mimic human intelligence. These systems are not limited to carrying out specific commands issued to them, but are capable of complex thought processes such as deduction, inference and reasoning once trained, coupled with their ability to scan vast and varied databases in a short space of time \u2013 something humans cannot do \u2013 as well as their capacity for self-learning and for continuously adapting their modes of operation and thinking independently of their developers and manufacturers. This makes the outcomes of their work unpredictable and rapidly changing, making them difficult to control and monitor. General AI also encompasses a model known as neural networks.<\/p>\n<p>As for its functions, AI is classified according to its purpose and its ability to interact with its surroundings; its sub-types differ depending on how it processes information, how it learns from data, and how it responds to stimuli. The forms of AI vary according to the technology on which they are based, and include types such as:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Machine learning: <\/strong>an advanced form of AI in which a machine has the ability to learn from data without the need for prior configuration or programming each time; it is therefore a field of continuous development. <a href=\"#_ftn22\" name=\"_ftnref22\"><sup>[22]<\/sup><\/a><\/li>\n<li><strong>Deep learning: <\/strong>based on simulating the human mind through what are known as artificial neural networks, which makes it better able to make complex decisions and recognise intricate patterns.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Natural Language Processing (NLP: <\/strong>enables machines to understand, interpret and respond to human language.<a href=\"#_ftn23\" name=\"_ftnref23\"><sup>[23]<\/sup><\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>A distinction is made between safe forms of AI \u2013 such as limited intelligence\u2013 and dangerous but hypothetical forms that are still under development. However, reality reveals genuine difficulties and risks even with existing safe forms, which pose considerable challenges in terms of governance, regulation, management and oversight.<\/p>\n<p><strong>\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n<h4><span style=\"color: #800000;\"><strong>Secondly: The National Strategy for Artificial Intelligence \u2013 Between Reality and Aspirations<\/strong><\/span><\/h4>\n<p>The regulatory context for AI in Egypt aligns with the global context surrounding this technology, where on-the-ground developments and applications are outpacing legal and administrative regulation,<a href=\"#_ftn24\" name=\"_ftnref24\"><sup>[24]<\/sup><\/a> as Egypt has seen the emergence of various AI applications over the past ten years, driven by technological and economic developments and cross-border companies, In addition, a number of research centres have launched initiatives in various sectors based on AI technologies, notably the pilot projects undertaken by the Access to Information for Development Centre at the American University in Cairo (A2K4D), which ranged from collaborative initiatives across North Africa, the Arab region and Africa with research institutions to build prototypes for open databases, or utilising existing open data in certain sectors. These included monitoring traffic systems on the Cairo Ring Road for safety purposes, as well as the creation of a solar energy prototype and the facilitation of the sharing of relevant open data on energy projects in Egypt by the relevant stakeholders.<a href=\"#_ftn25\" name=\"_ftnref25\"><sup>[25]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>The Egyptian government launched its first AI strategy in 2021, which ran until 2023. The second version of the strategy was published in 2025, with a timeframe extending to 2030. Between the launch of the two strategies, a number of explanatory documents were issued regarding the ethical considerations to be followed, such as the Egyptian Charter for Responsible AI and the Guidelines for Generative AI. Unlike the first AI strategy, which included a reference to and description of the experts who helped shape it \u2013 most of whom had a technocratic background \u2013 the second strategy made no mention of the experts involved in its development.<\/p>\n<p>The same applies to the Egyptian Charter for Responsible AI, which states that it is subject to review and updating every two years, based on input from experts; however, no information is available regarding these consultations or the groups taking part in them. On another note, the efforts of the Egyptian Centre for Artificial Intelligence reveal that extensive consultations have been held; however, these are limited to companies working on technology provision, technocrats, government institutions, and regional and international initiatives, without the participation of other bodies such as parliament or civil society, which would also reflect the users\u2019 perspective.<a href=\"#_ftn26\" name=\"_ftnref26\"><sup>[26]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>International experience highlights the importance of involving different sections of society in consultations on the regulation of AI, rather than limiting these discussions to technocrats alone. This ensures that public trust in the technology is built, guarantees a positive public response to it, and ensures that collective values and rules are established which are binding on all, whilst incorporating the demands and needs of all stakeholders.<\/p>\n<p>The Egyptian government is seeking to adopt AI technologies in the economy and government services, with the aim of generating new sources of national income and strengthening Egypt\u2019s regional role in the Arab and African arenas in the field of AI, as well as improving citizens\u2019 quality of life and the services provided to them through what are known as smart and secure services, thereby also achieving transparency and efficiency. The strategy posits that the integration of AI can address labour shortages in the fields of education and healthcare, facilitate access, and reduce risks and costs.<\/p>\n<p>The regulatory frameworks governing the use of AI also include a commitment to the values of transparency, fairness and accountability, and to informing users about how their data is used in AI technologies; however, the nature of the technology adopted, the sectors in which it is proposed for use, and the current state of its technical development in Egypt may limit the ability to adequately comply with these commitments.<\/p>\n<p>The regulatory frameworks governing the use of AI in Egypt need to set out concrete obligations to protect individuals\u2019 rights, so that claims for redress and accountability can be made, rather than merely containing general references to human rights.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>This importance stems from Egypt\u2019s international obligations, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 17 of which stipulates: \u201cFirst, no one shall be subjected, arbitrarily or unlawfully, to interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. Second, everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.\u201d By applying these treaties to the AI sector, they directly require the protection of transparency and ensuring that users are informed about how their data is used.<\/p>\n<p>At the sectoral level, the strategy aims to integrate AI technologies extensively into government sectors in the fields of agriculture, the environment, water management, healthcare, education, economic planning and economic development, manufacturing and smart infrastructure management, judicial services, energy, transport, tourism, culture, traffic control and urban planning. The strategy also set out other objectives, such as using AI to formulate policies for citizens and gauge public opinion, as well as assisting members of the House of Representatives in responding to citizens\u2019 enquiries by drafting replies using AI. The strategy included a breakdown of the specific tasks within each sector that would be entrusted to AI.<\/p>\n<p>We also find clear shortcomings in the various strategies and charters announced by the Egyptian government, which pose serious risks, particularly in light of the nature of the sectors explicitly targeted by the strategy, which are highly sensitive, such as \u201cjudicial services, the formulation of policies affecting citizens, and the gauging of public opinion\u201d \u2013 sectors which the European Union has classified as \u201chigh-risk\u201d in its Coordinated Rules on Artificial Intelligence<a href=\"#_ftn27\" name=\"_ftnref27\"><sup>[27]<\/sup><\/a>. This classification stems from the impact of AI on the guarantees of a fair trial, as emphasised in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights<a href=\"#_ftn28\" name=\"_ftnref28\"><sup>[28]<\/sup><\/a> under Article 14, and on freedom of opinion, expression and participation in public affairs under Articles 19 and 25. The risks associated with the application of AI in these sectors\u2014such as in \u2018gauging public opinion\u2019\u2014are heightened by the reality of public opinion being controlled in various ways in Egypt, thereby transforming what is termed the \u2018smart and secure services\u2019 strategy into tools for surveillance and monitoring. All of this points to a clear problem concerning a lack of transparency, whereby citizens\u2019 lives become increasingly exposed to state scrutiny whilst their avenues for redress diminish.<\/p>\n<p>The strategy and its accompanying guidelines have identified the types of applications and the targeted AI technologies, namely generative AI, neural networks, large natural language models, machine learning, and the development of a model for the Arabic language in the Egyptian dialect. The strategy aims to achieve the \u2018rapid adoption\u2019 of AI technology in the automation of government services and its integration into the government\u2019s decision-making process.<a href=\"#_ftn29\" name=\"_ftnref29\"><sup>[29]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Overall, the strategy and its complementary frameworks reflect a broad ambition to adopt AI technologies and a rapid drive to put them into practice. However, recommendations from international organisations such as the OECD call for caution, whilst human rights standards require human rights impact assessments, the establishment of oversight mechanisms, and the provision of remedies, as stipulated in the UNESCO Recommendation<a href=\"#_ftn30\" name=\"_ftnref30\"><sup>[30]<\/sup><\/a> on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence, which Egypt has ratified as a member state. At the regional level, Resolution No. 473 (2021) issued by the African Commission on Human and Peoples\u2019 Rights<a href=\"#_ftn31\" name=\"_ftnref31\"><sup>[31]<\/sup><\/a> calls on States Parties to ensure that the development and use of AI are consistent with the African Charter on Human and Peoples\u2019 Rights, and considers these very values\u2014transparency, accountability, justice, privacy and non-discrimination\u2014to be human rights principles rather than merely aspirational values.<\/p>\n<p>The resolution itself also refers to the \u2018epistemological injustice\u2019 resulting from the importation of AI technologies and the need to adapt them to African contexts, which is directly linked to the strategy\u2019s reliance on rapidly adopted imported technologies. This necessitates a review of certain aspects of the strategy to ensure that significant losses and costs are minimised in the event of failure or limited success, and to fulfil international and regional commitments in this area.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>The risks of expanding the scope of application<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>The National AI Strategy has expanded the range of sectors in which AI technologies are to be integrated, compared with the first version of the strategy, which was limited to the education, agriculture, health and water resource management sectors. This expansion included sectors such as transport, energy, the judiciary, culture, tourism, urban planning and traffic management.<\/p>\n<p>This expansion between the two strategies takes place over a period of no more than three years, with an average of five years as the timeframe for the effectiveness of each strategy. This raises questions regarding the applications of AI in the first strategy, and the assessment of its success and performance, which would justify this sectoral expansion in the second strategy as outlined.<\/p>\n<p>The risks associated with this expansion are highlighted by the OECD\u2019s recent observation that many AI tools and technologies applied in various fields around the world remain at the experimental or pilot stage, preventing their widespread adoption;<a href=\"#_ftn32\" name=\"_ftnref32\"><sup>[32]<\/sup><\/a> Indeed, some have been outright failures, resulting in significant losses and costs. The OECD therefore urges countries to exercise caution when considering the success stories promoted by other governments around the world, given the lack of clarity regarding the information available on such successes, as there is no ongoing, long-term evaluation that would allow for a thorough review and assessment.<\/p>\n<p>The OECD calls for sectoral expansion in the application of AI through a \u2018spill-over\u2019 approach, whereby implementation begins in a limited number of low-risk sectors for an extended period<a href=\"#_ftn33\" name=\"_ftnref33\"><sup>[33]<\/sup><\/a> before expanding into new, higher-risk and more critical sectors, whilst ensuring that workers in these sectors receive adequate and detailed training in this technology.<\/p>\n<p>The organisation also calls for implementation in areas offering quick returns and more predictable initial gains, before expanding into sectors that require long-term investment, followed by a careful assessment of whether the technology has been successful or not. The national strategy has taken a positive step in this regard by focusing, in the short term, on increasing the rates of scientific and academic publication by Egyptian universities and academics in the field of AI, with a view to improving Egypt\u2019s international rankings in this area; this is an area where rapid gains and returns can be achieved compared to practical applications in various sectors.<\/p>\n<p>Conversely, there appears to be a need to review the strategy\u2019s provisions regarding the integration of AI into the judicial sector and its specific functions, which included the provision of \u2018legal assistance\u2019 during trials, and the \u2018assessment of cases and claims based on an analysis of the cases, applicable laws and relevant case law\u2019, both of which are extremely high-stakes tasks, to the extent that entrusting them to a non-human entity raises serious concerns, particularly without clarification as to the decisions or actions that will result from these tasks. This application threatens the justice system and the entire legal process, and requires serious and wide-ranging discussions with the public.<\/p>\n<p>Sectoral expansion presents another challenge, namely the need to review the aforementioned AI technologies, so as to identify the most suitable technologies for each sector, in accordance with the tasks and requirements of each government role, as recommended by the OECD, since a single technology cannot be universally applied across all sectors.<\/p>\n<p>In tandem with the expansion of these sectors, there appears to be a need to clarify what model of governance will be adopted to manage AI, particularly in light of the proposals set out in the National Strategy for certain sectors, which will effectively promote decentralisation, as in the case of the agricultural sector. The strategy has set out objectives for the sector, including the provision of a virtual assistant application for farmers to determine which crops to grow and where on an annual basis. This raises questions about the formulation of agricultural policies in this sector and the role of the ministry and the relevant directorates; and whether this is intended to promote greater individual autonomy and decentralisation, and what the limits of the responsibility that AI will assume in this regard are.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Adopting Generative AI <\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>The National AI Strategy (2026\u20132030) and the Generative AI Guidelines (2026) have set out the specific type of AI intended for integration into the Egyptian context, namely generative AI, neural networks, large language models (LLMs) and machine learning. The strategy places significant emphasis on large language models, with a view to integrating them into specific sectors through the development of a local Arabic language model, in the Egyptian dialect, to provide these services to the Egyptian public.<\/p>\n<p>Whilst it is positive that attention has been paid to establishing guidelines for generative AI, alongside the national strategy, the absence of similar regulation for neural networks may represent a significant shortcoming in the regulatory framework for AI, particularly in light of the major challenges posed by the use of these two technologies. These types of AI pose significant threats, as experts and technologists recognise, particularly with regard to accountability and control over the final outcomes of these technologies, which tend to operate autonomously, independently and without human supervision, in a manner that makes it difficult even for the technologists themselves to predict their consequences.<a href=\"#_ftn34\" name=\"_ftnref34\"><sup>[34]<\/sup><\/a> The guidelines for generative AI have addressed how it is trained, whether through large-scale machine learning (as exemplified by neural networks), supervised or unsupervised self-learning, and through pattern recognition across massive datasets.<\/p>\n<p>This proposal requires a more specific approach \u2013 both legally and in terms of regulations \u2013 regarding which of these training mechanisms will be adopted, particularly given the potential for these mechanisms to operate independently and autonomously, making them difficult to control. The guidelines also included a discussion of what is known as agent intelligence, with attempts to integrate it with generative intelligence; this may further complicate the governance of these technologies and calls for further review, as well as clarification as to whether or not it will be integrated into the provision of the aforementioned government and sectoral services.<\/p>\n<p>The guidelines have sought to address the question of how data should be collected, by relying on open-source algorithms and tools, known as \u2018the White Box\/Illuminated Box\u2019<a href=\"#_ftn35\" name=\"_ftnref35\"><sup>[35]<\/sup><\/a> . This also requires clarification on how consistency and compliance can be achieved whilst relying on neural network and generative AI technologies, where there is a greater likelihood of \u2018black-box\u2019 operations<a href=\"#_ftn36\" name=\"_ftnref36\"><sup>[36]<\/sup><\/a> that are beyond oversight.<\/p>\n<p>To put this dilemma into perspective, the fundamental difference between the two models\u2014whether the white box or black box\u2014relates to the level of transparency, human interpretability and the traceability of the output. In the case of the first model \u2013 the \u2018white box\u2019 or \u2018transparent\u2019 model \u2013 these systems are highly transparent to human observers; the methodology and mathematical logic employed by the algorithms to reach their decisions can be traced, enabling a clear, verifiable and auditable understanding of how inputs were transformed into outputs, thereby facilitating accountability.<\/p>\n<p>The other model is the \u2018black box\u2019, so called because it is unclear what is happening inside it to produce such outputs, which constitutes structural opacity; Deep neural networks and generative AI rely on billions of operations and hidden layers, which process data autonomously through complex patterns that exceed the comprehension and cognitive capabilities of programmers. The gravity of this technical disparity casts a shadow over the issues of transparency and traceability, and prevents regulatory bodies from subjecting this model to effective oversight, which directly affects fairness and transparency.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>The centrality of the human element in artificial intelligence strategy<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>All international regulatory frameworks for the AI sector emphasise the need for people to be at the centre of the development, application and governance of AI. This means that the outputs of AI must be for the benefit of, and serve, humans, rather than undermining them and their economic opportunities by displacing them from the labour market and having AI take over their tasks.<\/p>\n<p>The centrality of the human being in this application means that they assume ultimate responsibility by making appropriate decisions based on AI recommendations, as well as by monitoring the AI throughout its operational process and life cycle to ensure it does not deviate from its intended objectives. However, whilst this consideration has remained clear in both versions of the strategy, the guidelines and the Egyptian AI Charter \u2013 which is commendable \u2013 delving into the details of the strategy (particularly the second version) with regard to specific sectors may steer its implementation in the wrong direction.<\/p>\n<p>The strategy has identified \u201cdeveloping educational curricula for basic education\u201d as one of the objectives for the use of AI in the education sector; on the economic and development front, it has added objectives such as \u201cformulating monetary and economic policies based on macroeconomic analysis\u201d and \u201ctracking and managing national resources\u201d. The same applies to the culture and tourism sectors, where the strategy has set out objectives such as \u2018developing a virtual tourist guide\u2019 and a \u2018personalised trip planning service\u2019<a href=\"#_ftn37\" name=\"_ftnref37\"><sup>[37]<\/sup><\/a> , all of which raise questions about the potential threats this poses to the human workforce in these sectors.<\/p>\n<p>Further highlighting the need for clarification in this context, the Egyptian Charter\u2019s reference to the \u2018potential loss of jobs\u2019 during the adoption of AI, which is acceptable provided that \u2018the gains are greater\u2019, whilst imposing an obligation on AI owners to provide alternative employment opportunities for those excluded from the labour market, as well as to provide temporary support to these workers. This situation risks widening economic and social disparities, contrary to the strategy\u2019s assertion that the adoption of AI technologies will bridge economic gaps and empower citizens.<\/p>\n<p>Although the Egyptian Charter on Responsible AI stipulates that the human element bears responsibility for the final decision, this is not sufficient. Given the announced expansion in the use of AI in the workplace, decision-making and analysis, there are fears that human oversight may remain purely bureaucratic and formal. This necessitates the existence of models that clarify the decision-making and analytical processes, to ensure genuine human oversight of final decisions. There are also fears that increased reliance on AI could lead to a decline in human capabilities and hinder their development, given the trend towards adopting natural language processing models \u2013 specifically for the Arabic language \u2013 to compensate for deficiencies in reading, writing and foreign language skills, as outlined in the strategy.<\/p>\n<table class=\" alignleft\" style=\"width: 96.7242%; border-style: solid; border-color: #000000;\" width=\"96.7242%\" cellpadding=\"5\">\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td style=\"width: 36.7703%;\" width=\"208\"><strong>AI makes<br \/>\ndecisions<br \/>\nand acts<br \/>\nindependently<\/strong><\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 33.5291%;\" width=\"208\"><strong>AI decides<br \/>\nand humans<br \/>\ncarry out<\/strong><\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 55.6501%;\" width=\"208\"><strong>AI makes recommendations<br \/>\nand humans<br \/>\nmake the<br \/>\ndecisions<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td style=\"width: 36.7703%;\" width=\"208\">Self-driving vehicles<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 33.5291%;\" width=\"208\">Identifying hazards<br \/>\nin pipelines<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 55.6501%;\" width=\"208\">Taking the lead<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td style=\"width: 36.7703%;\" width=\"208\">Traffic light automation<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 33.5291%;\" width=\"208\">Recruitment and<br \/>\nworkforce forecasting<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 55.6501%;\" width=\"208\">Credit ratings<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td style=\"width: 36.7703%;\" width=\"208\">Optimising Energy<br \/>\nUse in Facilities<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 33.5291%;\" width=\"208\">Commodity Price<br \/>\nand Procurement<br \/>\nExpansion<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 55.6501%;\" width=\"208\">Appointments<br \/>\nand recruitment<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<p><strong>A model for the distribution of responsibilities assigned to AI and its relationship with humans \u2013 the First Artificial Intelligence Strategy (2021\u20132023)<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Furthermore, the official move to adopt specific AI technologies, such as self-driving vehicles, requires a broader debate on who bears responsibility for the decisions made by this type of AI, particularly as it differs from other forms of AI that take the form of software\u00a0 in that it has a physical presence (hardware), and assumes independent responsibility for making decisions autonomously whilst in operation. This presents a major challenge that is evident in discussions on how to regulate this type of AI, which has a physical presence in reality and operates autonomously,<a href=\"#_ftn38\" name=\"_ftnref38\"><sup>[38]<\/sup><\/a> to the extent that experts are calling for this type of AI to be treated as a legal \u2018actor\u2019, with all the implications this has for accountability.<\/p>\n<p>Furthermore, the strategy\u2019s reliance on AI in the proposed sectors\u2014such as transport, medical diagnosis, and recruitment and employment\u2014is characterised by a high level of risk, in accordance with the European Union\u2019s legislation on this matter\u2013 given that AI malfunctions in these sectors pose a direct threat to human life, interests or social status, which necessitates greater human oversight and requires a review of that aspect of the strategy, adding a specific classification for the expected level of risk in the context of these applications and the proposed solution.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Databases and infrastructure<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>The operation of AI technology relies on the availability of high-quality, large-scale databases to feed the technology, as well as on the development of telecommunications and internet infrastructure within any national context<sup>.<a href=\"#_ftn39\" name=\"_ftnref39\">[39]<\/a><\/sup> The databases used for the technology may already exist on-premises or may be hosted on cloud-based systems.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Both systems share the need for significant financial investment to set them up and utilise them, yet each has its own limitations and advantages; Whilst the use of on-premises infrastructure within a country\u2019s territory enhances the potential for local data protection, cloud services are beneficial where such infrastructure is lacking, and they facilitate cross-border collaboration, albeit with the challenge that each party involved in this commercial transaction is subject to a different legal system.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>The National AI Strategy addressed the issue of databases, and appears to favour a hybrid approach, adopting a long-term objective of building domestic databases within the country and establishing secure, intelligent local cloud systems that will, in the long term, minimise the transfer of data across borders; this will pave the way for the data to be utilised at a later stage, once it has been converted into tradable monetary value for the benefit of the Egyptian government.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>However, the guidelines on generative AI have highlighted cross-border cooperation, which is likely to be relied upon in the early stages of implementation, through the use of private-sector companies\u2019 services and applications, until local infrastructure is established.\u00a0 Relying on applications provided by private-sector companies operating across borders presents several challenges. The first of these challenges is the need for a robust communications and network infrastructure capable of handling big data, which will lead to network congestion at certain times \u2013 typically during government working hours \u2013 particularly given the strategy\u2019s focus on government services. This is accompanied by a financial challenge, as the cost of purchasing such software is high, reaching millions of dollars according to some estimates. For training the most common and widely used models, the cost has been estimated at between 41 and 191 million dollars, or approximately one billion euros for the largest models.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Whilst the strategy calls for the use of open-source software to build databases, the reality is that there is a significant delay in the availability of government data; the majority of it has not been digitised; and what is available is not compatible with the mechanisms used by algorithms to read and process it. National strategies propose a path to addressing the database crisis by adopting a model of partnership with the private sector, which is a positive step; however, this is accompanied by limitations, as the private companies possessing large, reliable datasets are major corporations such as Amazon, Google and Uber, as opposed to small and medium-sized enterprises, which have limited databases. This highlights the challenge of sharing the data held by these companies \u2013 or similar entities \u2013 with governments, which requires the government itself to take the initiative in making information available through open databases.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Another key player in Egypt\u2019s IT market is imposing restrictions on open data, as it relies on proprietary, closed-source software<sup>.<a href=\"#_ftn40\" name=\"_ftnref40\">[40]<\/a><\/sup> Although previous strategies, such as the cloud computing strategy, sought to resolve the database crisis by consolidating and closing public sector data centres<sup>,<a href=\"#_ftn41\" name=\"_ftnref41\">[41]<\/a><\/sup> as a step towards coordination and centralisation, there is currently insufficient information available on the progress of this consolidation. Furthermore, generative AI models and natural language processing models consume an extremely large amount of electricity and require complex, large-scale computing programmes; these factors necessitate further discussion on how to ensure their sustainability in light of regional developments, which affect energy prices and threaten to reduce electricity supply for domestic use.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Other challenges are also evident, such as internet speeds in Egypt, which are among the slowest in the world, coupled with relatively high prices for internet services,<a href=\"#_ftn42\" name=\"_ftnref42\"><sup>[42]<\/sup><\/a> . There has also been a recent increase in the prices of home internet packages, which will hinder access to the internet. Furthermore, many mobile network operators block communication protocols such as VoIP<a href=\"#_ftn43\" name=\"_ftnref43\"><sup>[43]<\/sup><\/a> . Egypt also continues to rely on a copper-based telecoms infrastructure rather than fibre, and although this is currently being upgraded, the process is not yet complete, particularly when it comes to the cross-border transmission of data.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Harmonisation between the various laws and strategies governing the telecommunications sector<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>The regulation of AI is an extension of the regulation of information and communications technology; this implies the need to review all the strategies and laws governing that sector, so as to ensure a balance between them, which in turn will be reflected in the effective governance of this emerging technology. The AI strategy has been preceded by strategies such as cloud computing, the free and open-source software strategy, and the Digital Egypt strategy, all of which addressed sub-themes such as databases and their creation, the promotion of open data, guiding the government to play a role in the sector\u2019s activities in Egypt, and calling on the government to offer incentives to the private sector in the form of tax exemptions or cost-reduction packages. This requires building on these strategies and working to coordinate them in a way that ensures better governance of the sector.<\/p>\n<p>It also highlights the importance of laws and regulations for sectors utilising AI, such as personal data protection laws, consumer protection law, the Information Technology Crimes Act, the Electronic Signature Act, the Intellectual Property Act, the Telecommunications Act, and the Act Regulating the Use of Financial Technology,<a href=\"#_ftn44\" name=\"_ftnref44\"><sup>[44]<\/sup><\/a> as well as laws such as investment and commercial legislation to encourage investors to invest in AI-related services, a law regulating the circulation of information, and the Civil Service Act, given that national strategies focus primarily on government services.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>The laws governing the creation of databases in Egypt deserve particular attention, as this body of legislation is still ill-equipped to deal with the AI sector; for example, users\u2019 access to their own data is closely linked to the effectiveness of the personal data protection framework. Accordingly, Egypt enacted its first legislation on personal data protection with the passing of Law No. 151 of 2020<a href=\"#_ftn45\" name=\"_ftnref45\"><sup>[45]<\/sup><\/a> , The law was enacted without its implementing regulations, but the legislature required the Ministry of Communications to finalise the regulations within six months; these implementing regulations were finally issued on 1 November 2025 pursuant to Decision No. 816 of<a href=\"#_ftn46\" name=\"_ftnref46\"><sup>[46]<\/sup><\/a> 2025. The Personal Data Protection Centre<a href=\"#_ftn47\" name=\"_ftnref47\"><sup>[47]<\/sup><\/a> was established as the supervisory authority for personal data protection. The law still contains vague general provisions and grants the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology broad powers.<a href=\"#_ftn48\" name=\"_ftnref48\"><sup>[48]<\/sup><\/a> Furthermore, the delay in issuing the implementing regulations has led to considerable uncertainty regarding a large number of necessary interpretations of the law.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>The law is also expected to regulate open government data\u2014which the strategy emphasises\u2014as the fuel for AI applications; The importance of enacting a law on information sharing prior to the introduction of a law regulating AI is heightened by the strategy\u2019s proposed classifications of government information according to its sensitivity, a point also emphasised by the Open Data Strategy, which clearly stipulates that no data will be disclosed until both the \u2018Data Governance\u2019 Act and its implementing regulations, which means that the actual implementation of the AI strategy may be delayed.<a href=\"#_ftn49\" name=\"_ftnref49\"><sup>[49]<\/sup><\/a> The Open Data Strategy has positive aspects, such as stipulating that personal data must not be relied upon or disclosed, as well as calling for published data to be accessible and easy for citizens to understand; however, its full realisation requires the existence of a general law on freedom of information alongside it.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<h4><span style=\"color: #800000;\"><strong>Conclusion and Recommendations<\/strong><\/span><\/h4>\n<p><strong><br \/>\n<\/strong>The monitoring and analysis presented in this paper demonstrate that the government\u2019s rush towards the rapid adoption of AI lacks the robust human rights framework that is essential before any governance of AI can begin, in order to safeguard citizens\u2019 rights. The experiences of other countries and comparative legislation \u2013 particularly European Union legislation and UNESCO recommendations \u2013 have collectively confirmed that technology is not neutral, and that the governance of AI is, first and foremost, a human rights issue.<\/p>\n<p>As AI is integrated into the workings of the Egyptian state \u2013 from the judiciary, through public policy-making, to the gauging of public opinion and the management of public services \u2013 concerns are growing that AI will be transformed into sophisticated mechanisms for surveillance, classification and the restriction of the public sphere, thereby threatening fundamental rights \u2013 ranging from the right to privacy and guarantees of a fair trial to freedom of thought and expression \u2013 and their relationship with the risks posed by algorithms.<\/p>\n<p>This represents a huge cost, and keeping up with the technological race cannot justify society bearing all these burdens and risks, which directly affect its rights. The \u201crapid and widespread adoption of AI\u201d should be curbed, and a cautious, gradual approach to its use should be adopted, based on a prior and comprehensive assessment of its impact on human rights and the provision of mechanisms to enforce the relevant laws. The following recommendations may be addressed to the Egyptian authorities:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>To establish an ongoing community dialogue involving civil society, politicians and the ministries responsible for the relevant sectors, regarding the implementation of the National AI Strategy, as well as within the framework of the periodic review process of the guiding frameworks, which is to be held every two years to review and update these frameworks in accordance with the announcements made by the National Council for AI.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Any future review of the AI strategy must clearly set out the governance model the government prefers to adopt for the AI sector \u2013 whether this be adaptive governance or another approach \u2013 so as to ensure consistency with the other components of the national strategy governing the sector, the anticipated legislation and the regulatory frameworks.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>There is a need for extensive discussions on the sectors in which AI technologies are being integrated, to ensure that objectives and success criteria are defined, and that the interests of the key stakeholders in each sector are taken into account.<\/li>\n<li>Any future legislation must include clear definitions of the liability of approved AI applications and the legal status of these technologies in the performance of their functions and tasks.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<pre><a href=\"#_ftnref1\" name=\"_ftn1\"><sup>[1]<\/sup><\/a> First draft bill in the House of Representatives on AI governance\u2026 MP Amira Saber\u2019s bill comprises 24 articles, Darb website, 24 May 2024,<a href=\"https:\/\/daaarb.com\/%D8%A3%D9%88%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B9-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A8%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%AD%D9%88%D9%83%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7\/\"> https:\/\/daaarb.com\/\u0623\u0648\u0644-\u0645\u0634\u0631\u0648\u0639-\u0642\u0627\u0646\u0648\u0646-\u0628\u0645\u062c\u0644\u0633-\u0627\u0644\u0646\u0648\u0627\u0628-\u0639\u0646-\u062d\u0648\u0643\u0645\u0629-\u0627\/<\/a>\u00a0\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref2\" name=\"_ftn2\"><sup>[2]<\/sup><\/a> Head of the House of Representatives\u2019 Communications Committee: \u201cThe government has prepared a new draft bill on artificial intelligence\u201d, Al-Watan newspaper, 16 August 2025,<a href=\"https:\/\/www.elwatannews.com\/news\/details\/8117012\"> https:\/\/www.elwatannews.com\/news\/details\/8117012<\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref3\" name=\"_ftn3\"><sup>[3]<\/sup><\/a> OECD (2025), Governing with Artificial Intelligence: The State of Play and Way Forward in Core Government Functions, OECD Publishing, Paris,<a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1787\/795de142-en\"> https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1787\/795de142-en<\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref4\" name=\"_ftn4\"><sup>[4]<\/sup><\/a> OECD AI principles review, last updated in 2024,<a href=\"https:\/\/oecd.ai\/en\/ai-principles\"> https:\/\/oecd.ai\/en\/ai-principles<\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref5\" name=\"_ftn5\"><sup>[5]<\/sup><\/a> REGULATION (EU) 2024\/1689,<a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/legal-content\/EN\/TXT\/PDF\/?uri=OJ:L_202401689\"> https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/legal-content\/EN\/TXT\/PDF\/?uri=OJ:L_202401689<\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref6\" name=\"_ftn6\"><sup>[6]<\/sup><\/a> AI Act,<a href=\"https:\/\/shorturl.at\/FXnEf\"> https:\/\/shorturl.at\/FXnEf<\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref7\" name=\"_ftn7\"><sup>[7]<\/sup><\/a> Carl Gahnberg, \u2018What rules? Framing the governance of artificial agency\u2019, POLICY AND SOCIETY, 2021, VOL. 40, NO. 2, 194\u2013210, p. 196\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref8\" name=\"_ftn8\"><sup>[8]<\/sup><\/a> Matt O\u2019Shaughnessy, \u2018One of the biggest problems in regulating AI is agreeing on a definition\u2019, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 6 October 2022,<a href=\"https:\/\/shorturl.at\/fvnNw\"> https:\/\/shorturl.at\/fvnNw<\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref9\" name=\"_ftn9\"><sup>[9]<\/sup><\/a> Matt O\u2019Shaughnessy, \u2018How hype over AI superintelligence could lead to misguided policy\u2019, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 24 September 2023,<a href=\"https:\/\/shorturl.at\/SBBzq\"> https:\/\/shorturl.at\/SBBzq<\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref10\" name=\"_ftn10\"><sup>[10]<\/sup><\/a> Roxana Radu, \u2018Steering the governance of artificial intelligence: national strategies in perspective\u2019, POLICY AND SOCIETY, 2021, VOL. 40, NO. 2, 178\u2013193\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref11\" name=\"_ftn11\"><sup>[11]<\/sup><\/a> Nithin Monteiro SJ, Vaishali Singh, \u2018The wheel of artificial intelligence governance\u2019, Sustainable Future (10), 2025, pp. 7\u20139\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref12\" name=\"_ftn12\"><sup>[12]<\/sup><\/a> Nithin Monteiro SJ, Vaishali Singh, \u2018The wheel of artificial intelligence governance\u2019, Sustainable Future (10), 2025, pp. 7\u20139\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref13\" name=\"_ftn13\"><sup>[13]<\/sup><\/a> Mariana Mazzucato, Marietje Schaake, Seb Krier &amp; Josh Entsminger, (2022), \u2018Governing artificial intelligence in the public interest\u2019, UCL Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose, Working Paper Series (IIPP WP 2020-12).<a href=\"https:\/\/www.ucl.ac.uk\/bartlett\/public-purpose\/wp2022-12\"> https:\/\/www.ucl.ac.uk\/bartlett\/public-purpose\/wp2022-12<\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref14\" name=\"_ftn14\"><sup>[14]<\/sup><\/a> EU Regulation (2024\/68),<a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/legal-content\/EN\/TXT\/PDF\/?uri=OJ:L_202401689\"> https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/legal-content\/EN\/TXT\/PDF\/?uri=OJ:L_202401689<\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref15\" name=\"_ftn15\"><sup>[15]<\/sup><\/a> The EU AI Act\u2019s Transparency Rules: A Practical Guide to Article 50, 14 May 2026,<a href=\"https:\/\/artificialintelligenceact.eu\/transparency-rules-article-50\/\"> https:\/\/artificialintelligenceact.eu\/transparency-rules-article-50\/<\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref16\" name=\"_ftn16\"><sup>[16]<\/sup><\/a> The impact of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) on Artificial Intelligence, European Parliamentary Research Service, PE 641.530 \u2013 June 2020,<a href=\"https:\/\/shorturl.at\/YOUhk\"> https:\/\/shorturl.at\/YOUhk<\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref17\" name=\"_ftn17\"><sup>[17]<\/sup><\/a> Explanatory Notice and Template for the Public Summary of Training Content for general-purpose AI models,<a href=\"https:\/\/digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu\/en\/library\/explanatory-notice-and-template-public-summary-training-content-general-purpose-ai-models\"> https:\/\/digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu\/en\/library\/explanatory-notice-and-template-public-summary-training-content-general-purpose-ai-models<\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref18\" name=\"_ftn18\"><sup>[18]<\/sup><\/a> Bal\u00e1zs Hohmann, Gerg\u0151 Koll\u00e1r, \u2018Reflections on the data protection compliance of AI systems under\r\nthe EU AI Act\u2019, Cogent Social Sciences, 2025, Vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 1\u201320\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref19\" name=\"_ftn19\"><sup>[19]<\/sup><\/a> Soraya Kouadri Most\u00e9faoui et al., \u2018Beyond principles: Adaptive governance for AI\u2019s next frontier\u2019, Sprite,<a href=\"https:\/\/shorturl.at\/AdqzX\"> https:\/\/shorturl.at\/AdqzX<\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref20\" name=\"_ftn20\"><sup>[20]<\/sup><\/a> Araz Taeihagh, \u2018Governance of artificial intelligence\u2019, POLICY AND SOCIETY, 2021, Vol. 40, No. 2, pp. 137\u2013157, p. 145\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref21\" name=\"_ftn21\"><sup>[21]<\/sup><\/a> An overview of IBM\u2019s definitions of various artificial intelligence technologies,<a href=\"https:\/\/shorturl.at\/bNMaD\"> https:\/\/shorturl.at\/bNMaD<\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref22\" name=\"_ftn22\"><sup>[22]<\/sup><\/a> Types of AI: explore key categories and uses, Syracuse University, 26 March 2025,<a href=\"https:\/\/ischool.syracuse.edu\/types-of-ai\/\"> https:\/\/ischool.syracuse.edu\/types-of-ai\/<\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref23\" name=\"_ftn23\"><sup>[23]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid.\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref24\" name=\"_ftn24\"><sup>[24]<\/sup><\/a> Araz Taeihagh, \u201cGovernance of artificial intelligence\u201d, POLICY AND SOCIETY, 2021, VOL. 40, NO. 2, 137\u2013157, p. 139\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref25\" name=\"_ftn25\"><sup>[25]<\/sup><\/a> Nagla Rizk, Nancy Salem &amp; Stefanie Felsberger, \u2018O34: Middle East and North Africa\u2019, in The State of Open Data: Histories and Horizons, ed. (Tim Davies, Stephen B. Walker, Mor Rubinstein &amp; Fernando Perini), African Minds &amp; IDRC, 2019, p. 506\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref26\" name=\"_ftn26\"><sup>[26]<\/sup><\/a> For further data, please visit the Egyptian Centre for Artificial Intelligence website,<a href=\"%20https:\/ai.gov.eg\/events\/events-list\"> https:\/\/ai.gov.eg\/events\/events-list<\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref27\" name=\"_ftn27\"><sup>[27]<\/sup><\/a> The European Commission, the AI Act (EU AI Act) \u2013 Regulation (EU) 2024\/1689 on harmonised rules for artificial intelligence, which entered into force on 1 August 2024,<a href=\"https:\/\/digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu\/en%EE%80%80\/policies\/regulatory-framework-ai\"> https:\/\/digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu\/en\/policies\/regulatory-framework-ai<\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref28\" name=\"_ftn28\"><sup>[28]<\/sup><\/a> United Nations, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted and opened for signature by General Assembly Resolution 2200 (XXI) of 16 December 1966, and entered into force on 23 March 1976, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/ar\/instruments-mec%EE%80%80hanisms\/instruments\/international-covena%EE%80%80nt-civil-and-political-rights\">https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/ar\/instruments-mechanisms\/instruments\/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights<\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref29\" name=\"_ftn29\"><sup>[29]<\/sup><\/a> The first version of the Artificial Intelligence Strategy 2021\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref30\" name=\"_ftn30\"><sup>[30]<\/sup><\/a>UNESCO, Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence, adopted in November 2021,<a href=\"https:\/\/www.unesco.org\/en\/artificial-intelligence\/recommendation-ethics\"> https:\/\/www.unesco.org\/en\/artificial-intelligence\/recommendation-ethics<\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref31\" name=\"_ftn31\"><sup>[31]<\/sup><\/a> Artificial Intelligence, Robotics and Other Emerging Technologies in Africa, ACHPR\/Res. 473 (EXT.OS\/XXXI) 2021, adopted on 25 February 2021,<a href=\"https:\/\/achpr.au.int\/en\/adopted-res%EE%80%80olutions\/473%EE%80%80-resolution-%EE%80%80need-undertak%EE%80%80e-study-human-and-peoples-rights-and-%EE%80%80art\"> https:\/\/achpr.au.int\/en\/adopted-resolutions\/473-resolution-need-undertake-study-human-and-peoples-rights-and-art<\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref32\" name=\"_ftn32\"><sup>[32]<\/sup><\/a> Governing with Artificial Intelligence: the state of play and way forward in core government functions, OECD, 25 September 2025,<a href=\"https:\/\/www.oecd.org\/content\/dam\/oecd\/en\/publications\/reports\/2025\/06\/governing-with-artificial-intelligence_398fa287\/795de142-en.pdf\"> https:\/\/www.oecd.org\/content\/dam\/oecd\/en\/publications\/reports\/2025\/06\/governing-with-artificial-intelligence_398fa287\/795de142-en.pdf<\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref33\" name=\"_ftn33\"><sup>[33]<\/sup><\/a> Mark Fagan, \u2018AI for the people: Use cases for government\u2019, Mossavar-Rahmani Centre for Business &amp; Government, August 2025,<a href=\"https:\/\/shorturl.at\/WVLi7\"> https:\/\/shorturl.at\/WVLi7<\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref34\" name=\"_ftn34\"><sup>[34]<\/sup><\/a> David Thiel, Melissa Stroebel and Rebecca Portnoff, \u2018Generative ML and CSAM: Implications and Mitigations\u2019, Stanford: Internet Observatory: Cyber Policy Centre, 24 June 2023\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref35\" name=\"_ftn35\"><sup>[35]<\/sup><\/a> Cynthia Rudin, \u201cStop explaining black-box machine learning models for high-stakes decisions and use interpretable models instead\u201d, *Nature Machine Intelligence*, Vol. 1, No. 5 (May 2019), pp. 206\u2013215,<a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1038\/s42256-019-0048-x\"> https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1038\/s42256-019-0048-x<\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref36\" name=\"_ftn36\"><sup>[36]<\/sup><\/a> Pasquale, F. (2015). The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control Money and Information. Harvard University Press.\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref37\" name=\"_ftn37\"><sup>[37]<\/sup><\/a> The Second National Strategy for Artificial Intelligence (2025\u20132030), downloadable from the National Council for Artificial Intelligence website:<a href=\"https:\/\/ai.gov.eg\"> https:\/\/ai.gov.eg<\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref38\" name=\"_ftn38\"><sup>[38]<\/sup><\/a> Carl Gahnberg, \u2018What rules? Framing the governance of artificial agency\u2019, POLICY AND SOCIETY, 2021, Vol. 40, No. 2, 194\u2013210, p. 196\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref39\" name=\"_ftn39\"><sup>[39]<\/sup><\/a> Nagla Rizk, \u2018Artificial Intelligence and inequality in the Middle East\u2019, in The Oxford Handbook of Ethics of Artificial Intelligence (2020), ed. Markus D. Dubber, Frank Pasquale &amp; Sunit Das, July 2020, available at:<a href=\"https:\/\/papers.ssrn.com\/sol3\/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3659290\"> https:\/\/papers.ssrn.com\/sol3\/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3659290<\/a>, pp. 5\u20136\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref40\" name=\"_ftn40\"><sup>[40]<\/sup><\/a> Free and Open-Source Software Strategy, Ministry of Communications and Information Technology,<a href=\"https:\/\/shorturl.at\/Qx9Nl\"> https:\/\/shorturl.at\/Qx9Nl<\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref41\" name=\"_ftn41\"><sup>[41]<\/sup><\/a> Cloud Computing Strategy,<a href=\"https:\/\/shorturl.at\/STeYm\"> https:\/\/shorturl.at\/STeYm<\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref42\" name=\"_ftn42\"><sup>[42]<\/sup><\/a> Issues surrounding the pricing of internet services in Egypt, Freedom of Thought and Expression Foundation, 27 June 2022,<a href=\"https:\/\/shorturl.at\/lBl4R\"> https:\/\/shorturl.at\/lBl4R<\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref43\" name=\"_ftn43\"><sup>[43]<\/sup><\/a> Nagla Rizk, Artificial Intelligence and Inequality in the Middle East, op.icd, p. 15\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref44\" name=\"_ftn44\"><sup>[44]<\/sup><\/a> Regulation of Artificial Intelligence in Egypt: Proposed Standards and Principles, Masar, 25 March 2025,<a href=\"https:\/\/masaar.net\/ar\/egypt-ai-regulation\/\"> https:\/\/masaar.net\/ar\/egypt-ai-regulation\/<\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref45\" name=\"_ftn45\"><sup>[45]<\/sup><\/a> The Egyptian Charter for Responsible Artificial Intelligence, Version 1.0, 2023,<a href=\"https:\/\/ai.gov.eg\/SynchedFiles\/en\/Resources\/Egyptian%20Charter%20For%20Responsible%20AI.pdf\"> https:\/\/ai.gov.eg\/SynchedFiles\/en\/Resources\/Egyptian%20Charter%20For%20Responsible%20AI.pdf<\/a>\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref46\" name=\"_ftn46\"><sup>[46]<\/sup><\/a> Regulations for the Implementation of the Personal Data Protection Act, Personal Data Protection Centre website, link:\r\n\r\n<a href=\"https:\/\/pdpc.gov.eg\/laws\">https:\/\/pdpc.gov.eg\/laws<\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref47\" name=\"_ftn47\"><sup>[47]<\/sup><\/a> Personal Data Protection Centre (Egypt), \u2018About\u2019 page,<a href=\"https:\/\/pdpc.gov.eg\/about\"> https:\/\/pdpc.gov.eg\/about<\/a>\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref48\" name=\"_ftn48\"><sup>[48]<\/sup><\/a>The Personal Data Protection Act in the Light of International Standards, https:\/\/afteegypt.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/07\/\u0648\u0631\u0642\u0629-\u0642\u0627\u0646\u0648\u0646-\u0627\u0644\u0628\u064a\u0627\u0646\u0627\u062a-\u0627\u0644\u0634\u062e\u0635\u064a\u0629.pdf\u00a0\u00a0\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#_ftnref49\" name=\"_ftn49\"><sup>[49]<\/sup><\/a> Open Data Strategy, 2025, available on the National Council for Artificial Intelligence\u2019s website.<\/pre>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Contents Methodology Introduction Section One: AI Governance: Technical Specifics and Challenges of Prioritisation and Regulation Worldwide Section Two: The National Artificial Intelligence Strategy: Between Reality and Aspirations Conclusion and Recommendations &nbsp; Methodology In its analysis and assessment, the paper drew on a desk review of a number of international reference frameworks on the governance of [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":88,"featured_media":41499,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_lmt_disableupdate":"no","_lmt_disable":"","_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[968,970],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-41498","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-research-en","category-research-papers-en"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v26.1.1 - 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