{"id":41878,"date":"2026-10-15T15:14:36","date_gmt":"2026-10-15T12:14:36","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/afteegypt.org\/?p=41878"},"modified":"2026-10-15T15:14:36","modified_gmt":"2026-10-15T12:14:36","slug":"journalists-from-investigation-to-trial","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/afteegypt.org\/en\/research-en\/2026\/10\/15\/41878-afteegypt.html","title":{"rendered":"Journalists: From Investigation to Trial"},"content":{"rendered":"

Journalists: From Investigation to Trial<\/strong><\/span><\/h2>\n

(A Case Study)<\/strong><\/span><\/h2>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Contents<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Methodology<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Introduction<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Background: General Context of Referral to Trial<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

First: Legal Framework Governing the Commencement of Trial<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Second: Cases of Journalists\u00a0 During the Investigation Stage<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Third: Referral to Trial and Its Impact on the Legal Status of Journalists <\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Conclusion and Recommendations<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

Methodology<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

This paper adopts a case-study approach to analyse the transition of four journalists\u2019 cases from the investigation stage to trial. It traces the procedural course of each case and examines whether referral to trial brought about any substantive change in the journalists\u2019 legal status, defence safeguards, or conditions of detention once their cases moved before the trial court. The paper examines the cases of four journalists referred to trial: Khaled Mamdouh, Hamdy El-Zaeem, Ashraf Omar and Yasser Abu Al-Ela. These cases were selected because they had already moved from investigation to trial, allowing the legal and procedural consequences of that transition to be traced.<\/p>\n

The paper also draws on semi-structured interviews with five lawyers representing the individuals in the cases under study. The interviews were conducted remotely through a social-media application in June and July 2026, alongside communication with a number of the journalists\u2019 family members. They covered the course of each case from arrest through referral to trial; the nature of the investigations; changes in the charges; detention-renewal procedures; the impact of referral on the journalists\u2019 circumstances and defence safeguards; and the lawyers\u2019 assessment of whether referral produced any practical change in their clients\u2019 legal status.<\/p>\n

In addition to the interviews, the paper reviews and analyses a range of legal and human-rights sources. These include the legislation governing pretrial detention and referral to trial, principally Criminal Procedure law No. 150 of 1950, Law No. 180 of 2018 Regulating the Press and Media, and the Egyptian Constitution, as well as relevant international standards on the rights to liberty and a fair trial, particularly the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and General Comment No. 35 of the\u00a0 UN Human Rights Committee.<\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

Introduction<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

In 2025 and 2026, there was a broad wave of referrals of cases from the Supreme State Security Prosecution to criminal courts after varying periods of pretrial detention, spanning years in some cases. These referrals included a number of journalists who had remained in detention for extended periods before their cases moved to the trial stage. The post-referral stage has received comparatively little study or analysis, a gap this paper seeks to address.<\/p>\n

Referral orders move journalists\u2019 cases into a different procedural stage, in which the jurisdiction entity hearing the case is expected to change, defence safeguards should expand, and decisions to continue detention should come under the supervision of the trial court. Yet the transfer of a case to court does not necessarily mean that these effects are realised in practice. This raises the question of how far referral to trial actually changes the legal status of detained journalists.<\/p>\n

The referrals examined in this paper took place within a broader wave of referrals to the criminal courts of cases handled by the Supreme State Security Prosecution, a trend that became particularly noticeable from late 2024. According to monitoring published by Zawia3, the Supreme State Security Prosecution referred 138 cases to trial between October 2024 and January 2025, involving more than 8,000 defendants. The report described these referrals as the largest of their kind since 2013. The referred cases spanned different years, from 2017 to 2024, indicating that the wave involved taking procedural action on a number of cases that had remained under investigation for extended periods. The referrals of the journalists examined in this paper occurred within this wider context.[1]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Accordingly, the paper first reviews the context in which this wave of referrals of journalists\u2019 cases emerged, then sets out the legal framework governing the transition from investigation to trial, before analysing four cases involving journalists who were referred to trial.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Background: General Context of Referral to Trial<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

The detention of journalists has remained on the agenda of human-rights organisations and the Egyptian Journalists Syndicate in recent years. In this context, the Association for Freedom of Thought and Expression (AFTE) documented at least 16 journalists held in pretrial detention, some for more than two years without referral to trial, alongside the use of what is known as \u201ccase recycling\u201d to keep some journalists detained in connection with new cases. The Journalists Syndicate and human-rights organisations focused their demands on ending prolonged pretrial detention and securing the journalists\u2019 release, on the basis that the central problem was the continuation of investigations for years without the cases reaching trial.[2]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Some cases initiated between 2020 and 2024 continued for years without resolution, while journalists remained in pretrial detention pending investigation. In some instances, several years elapsed between a journalist\u2019s arrest and referral to trial. In 2025, however, this pattern began to shift as a number of these pending cases were referred to the Criminal Courts.<\/p>\n

The issue of detained journalists was no longer limited to those held pending investigation; it also came to include journalists whose cases had been referred to criminal courts.[3]<\/sup><\/a> This change in the procedural course of the cases was not separate from the legal environment in which journalists had faced prosecution in recent years\u2014an environment that allowed conduct connected to publishing and expression to be addressed through legal provisions extending beyond traditional press offences. In this context, a number of journalists were prosecuted on charges such as \u201cjoining a terrorist organization\u201d, \u201cpublishing false news and statements\u201d, and \u201cmisuse of social media\u201d.<\/p>\n

This points to a tension within the legal framework governing such conduct. Although the Egyptian Constitution, as a general rule, prohibits custodial penalties for offences committed through publication or public dissemination, provisions scattered across the Penal Code, counter-terrorism legislation and cybercrime laws still allow imprisonment in cases whose underlying conduct may consist of publishing an opinion, information or journalistic material. The significance of these provisions lies in their ability to recharacterise journalistic activity outside the framework of publication offences and link it instead to allegations involving national security, terrorism or the publication of false news, thereby opening the way to pretrial detention and subsequent referral to criminal courts.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

This has taken place against a broader backdrop of declining press freedom. Reporters Without Borders (RSF) ranked Egypt 169th out of 180 countries in its 2026 World Press Freedom Index,[4]<\/sup><\/a> pointing to deterioration in the legal indicator and the use of national-security and counter-terrorism legislation to restrict journalistic work. In response to this shift, the Journalists Syndicate\u2019s demands did not end with the issuance of referral orders. In January 2025, the head of the Egyptian Journalists Syndicate, Khaled El-Balshy, submitted a memorandum to the Prosecutor General calling for the release of journalists held in pretrial detention, particularly those who had exceeded the legal maximum limit of pretrial detention. The memorandum followed earlier correspondence from the Syndicate to the relevant authorities, with the Syndicate expressing its readiness to guarantee their appearance before the court.[5]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

On 27 February of the same year, the Freedom Committee of the Journalists Syndicate also met with several families of detained journalists to discuss their circumstances, ways of supporting them and demands for their release. Relatives of Ashraf Omar and Hamdy El-Zaeem\u2014two of the cases examined in this paper\u2014took part in the meeting.[6]<\/sup><\/a> The Syndicate\u2019s efforts also included following up on individual cases. In Yasser Abu Al-Ela\u2019s case, following his arrest and enforced disappearance in March 2024, the Syndicate filed a complaint with the Prosecutor General seeking disclosure of his whereabouts, permission for his family to visit him and access for his lawyer to communicate with him.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

More generally, regarding detained journalists, the Journalists Syndicate\u2019s Freedom Committee stated in July 2024 that it had received complaints from families of detained journalists and had contacted the Prosecutor General about them; some of these complaints had been resolved, while others remained unresolved.[7]<\/sup><\/a> The same position continued in 2026, when the Syndicate stressed that the referral of most cases to trial did not negate its right to demand the journalists\u2019 release and their trial while at liberty. These efforts show that the Syndicate\u2019s role in the issue of detained journalists included issuing statements and calling for releases, communicating with judicial authorities and journalists\u2019 families, and intervening in some cases to seek guarantees that detainees could communicate with their defence teams.[8]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

First: Legal Framework Governing the Commencement of Trial<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Under Egyptian law, criminal proceedings pass through two principal stages: investigation and trial. A referral order brings the investigation stage to an end and moves the proceedings to trial, transferring the case from the investigating authority to the trial court. This transition entails more than a change in the authority responsible for the case; it also changes the nature of the procedures and safeguards governing the proceedings. During the investigation stage, the objective is to gather evidence and determine whether the case is fit to proceed to trial. At trial, by contrast, the evidence is examined in public proceedings involving the prosecution and the defence, culminating in a judicial determination of the charges.[9]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

This transition is particularly important in light of the wave of journalists\u2019 cases referred to trial in 2025 and 2026. The debate no longer concerns only the lawfulness or duration of pretrial detention; it also extends to whether referral produced any substantive change in the journalists\u2019 legal status, or whether detention and procedural restrictions continued after the cases moved before the court.<\/p>\n

The cases examined in this paper are governed by Criminal Procedure Law No. 150 of 1950, which was the law in force when the journalists were arrested, investigated and referred to trial.[10]<\/sup><\/a> Criminal Procedure Law No. 174 of 2025, by contrast, is not due to enter into force until 1 October 2027 and therefore does not apply to these cases.<\/p>\n

For journalists, the legal framework governing this stage is not limited to the Criminal Procedure Law. Article 41 of Law No. 180 of 2018 Regulating the Press and Media prohibits pretrial detention for offences committed through publication or the media, except for offences involving incitement to violence, discrimination between citizens or impugning individuals\u2019 honour.[11]<\/sup><\/a> This provision reflects a legislative approach under which publication cases should, as a rule, be handled without resort to pretrial detention. The cases examined here, however, were not investigated solely as publication offences. They were accompanied by other charges, such as joining or financing a terrorist group, or participating with a terrorist group in achieving its objectives. In practice, this placed them outside the special safeguards established by the Law Regulating the Press and Media and subjected them to the procedures applied in State Security cases.<\/p>\n

The transfer of proceedings to the court also has implications for the continuation of pretrial detention. Once a referral order has been issued, detention is no longer subject to the authority of the investigating body; responsibility for reviewing it passes to the competent court that will hear the case. Article 143 of the Criminal Procedure Law[12]<\/sup><\/a> therefore requires the prosecution, where a referral order is issued before the period of pretrial detention expires, to submit the detention order to the competent court within five days of notification of the referral order; otherwise, the accused must be released. In other words, detention after referral does not continue automatically, but is subject to review by the competent court.[13]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

The practical application of this provision has nevertheless generated legal disagreement over the scope of the court\u2019s authority after referral. While Article 143[14]<\/sup><\/a> regulates the transfer of responsibility for reviewing detention to the court, Article 380[15]<\/sup><\/a> empowers the criminal court, while hearing the case, to order the arrest or pretrial detention of the accused or to order their release. The relationship between the two provisions has been contested. One view holds that, following referral, the court exercises its detention powers under Article 380. Another maintains that those powers remain subject to the safeguards and time limits set out in Article 143, because pretrial detention remains a measure imposed before any conviction and its legal character does not change merely because the case has moved to court.[16]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

The implications of this disagreement extend beyond statutory interpretation to the limits of judicial scrutiny over continued detention after referral. The transfer of a case to court does not in itself create a new justification for continued detention; detention remains subject to its legal grounds and to review by the competent court.[17]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

This is consistent with international fair-trial standards. Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights[18]<\/sup><\/a> establishes that detention pending trial should not be the general rule and that deprivation of liberty before judgment should remain exceptional and justified by genuine necessity, with the right to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. General Comment No. 35 of the Human Rights Committee further affirms that continued detention may not result automatically from the length of proceedings or from a case moving from one procedural stage to another; on each occasion, it must rest on specific grounds capable of judicial review.[19]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

The safeguards associated with referral are not limited to detention; they also extend to defence rights. Once a case moves before the trial court, the defence should be able to access the case file and prosecution evidence sufficiently in advance of trial and should have a genuine opportunity to prepare its case and challenge the evidence before the court. Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights[20]<\/sup><\/a> recognises this right as a core component of a fair trial.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

The enactment of Criminal Procedure Law No. 174 of 2025 does not alter this analysis, since it does not apply to the cases under study, all of which are governed by Criminal Procedure Law No. 150 of 1950. The new law nevertheless introduced a number of changes to the regulation of pretrial detention compared with the existing law. Among other changes, it reduces the maximum period of pretrial detention from six to four months for misdemeanours, from eighteen to twelve months for felonies, and from two years to eighteen months for offences punishable by life imprisonment or death. It also regulates measures that may be imposed as alternatives to pretrial detention and introduces a framework for compensation for pretrial detention in specified circumstances. Although it does not apply to the cases examined here, the new law therefore reflects a legislative direction towards restructuring certain aspects of pretrial detention and reducing its duration.[21]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Observations made by the Journalists Syndicate and a number of human-rights organisations regarding certain provisions of the new law\u2014particularly those concerning defence safeguards and access to case files\u2014also show that the debate has expanded beyond the lawfulness of pretrial detention to encompass the safeguards that should accompany the transition from investigation to trial.[22]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

This framework shows that the legal consequences of referral extend beyond the transfer of proceedings to a court. They also encompass the safeguards that should accompany that transfer, including those governing continued detention, defence rights and the conduct of the trial. Against this background, the following section examines how these issues operated in practice in the cases under study.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Second: Journalists\u2019 Cases During the Investigation Stage<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

In Khaled Mamdouh\u2019s case, he was arrested at his home on 16 July 2024 and did not appear before the Supreme State Security Prosecution until 21 July, after contact with him had been lost. Legal monitoring also identified a discrepancy between the actual date of arrest and the date recorded in the police report, which placed the arrest four days after the date given by his family and defence. Following his appearance, he was questioned in connection with Case No. 1282 of 2024 (Supreme State Security Prosecution). The prosecution charged him with joining a terrorist group, committing an offence of financing a terrorist group, and publishing false news and statements. It ordered his pretrial detention for 15 days pending investigation, after which his detention continued to be renewed in connection with the case.[23]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Ashraf Omar\u2019s case followed a similar procedural course. He was arrested at his home on 22 July 2024 and appeared before the Supreme State Security Prosecution around two days later, where he was questioned in connection with Case No. 1568 of 2024 (Supreme State Security Prosecution). During the investigation stage, he was charged with joining a terrorist group, publishing false news and statements, and misusing social media. His pretrial detention was subsequently renewed in connection with the case.[24]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

After approximately 16 months in pretrial detention, a decision was issued on 15 November 2025 referring him to criminal trial. Following referral, the proceedings were registered as Case No. 11846 of 2025 before the Fifth Settlement Criminal Court, also registered as No. 2240 of 2025 before the New Cairo Court of First Instance, and as No. 1568 of 2024 in State Security records. The scope of the charges in the referral order also changed. The earlier charges of joining a terrorist group, publishing false news and misusing social media were dropped, and Ashraf Omar was referred to trial on two charges: \u201cparticipating with a terrorist group in achieving its objectives\u201d and \u201ccommitting a terrorism-financing offence through funds, data and information\u201d, according to his lawyer Khaled Ali.[25]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Hamdy El-Zaeem, meanwhile, was rearrested in January 2021, years after an earlier case in which he had been released subject to precautionary measures. According to a member of his family, he was subjected to enforced disappearance for twelve days before appearing before the Supreme State Security Prosecution, where he was questioned in connection with Case No. 955 of 2020 (Supreme State Security Prosecution). He was charged with joining a terrorist group and participating in a criminal agreement aimed at committing a terrorist offence, and was ordered into pretrial detention. His detention continued to be renewed in connection with the case. By January 2023, he had spent more than two years in pretrial detention without being released. He was eventually referred to trial on 5 January 2025, after approximately four years in pretrial detention.[26]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

In Yasser Abu Al-Ela\u2019s case, he was arrested at his home on 10 March 2024 and was then subjected to enforced disappearance for a full month\u2014the longest period of disappearance among the four cases, according to the defence. After he appeared before the Supreme State Security Prosecution, he was questioned in connection with Case No. 1568 of 2024 (Supreme State Security Prosecution), and charged with joining a terrorist group, publishing false news, and using a website to commit the offence. He was ordered into pretrial detention, which continued to be renewed until his referral to criminal trial during 2025. Following referral, the case was registered as Case No. 11846 of 2025 before the Fifth Settlement Criminal Court. He was later sentenced in absentia to life imprisonment in another case, despite already being detained in connection with the case examined here. This distinguishes his circumstances from the other cases without altering the basic procedural course of the case under study.[27]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

The four cases show that differences in their facts did not alter the broad procedural pattern preceding referral to trial. In each case, the process began with arrest. In three cases, this was followed by a period during which contact with the detainee was lost or by enforced disappearance of varying duration, before the journalists appeared before the Supreme State Security Prosecution and were questioned in cases involving similar charges, most prominently joining a terrorist group and publishing false news or statements. Orders for pretrial detention then followed. The significance of this similarity is that it shows referral to trial was not the starting point of the proceedings against the journalists; rather, it came at a late stage in a process that had begun at the moment of arrest.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Pretrial Detention Before Referral<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

This section does not seek to assess the lawfulness of pretrial detention in itself. Rather, it traces the relationship between the journalists\u2019 continued detention and the continuation of the investigations that had justified that detention before the cases were referred to trial. As an investigative measure, pretrial detention is expected to be linked to the progress of investigative steps and the gathering of evidence. It is therefore important to examine whether investigations continued throughout the period of detention, or whether detention was extended while the investigations remained relatively static.<\/p>\n

The four cases reveal a broadly similar pattern. In most of them, substantive investigation was largely confined to the initial questioning session following the journalists\u2019 appearance before the Supreme State Security Prosecution. Subsequent procedures were primarily detention-renewal hearings extending over months and, in some cases, years before referral orders were issued.<\/p>\n

In Khaled Mamdouh\u2019s case, lawyer Mokhtar Mounir stated that his client was not subjected to any new substantive questioning after the initial investigation session and that the subsequent procedures were limited to renewals of detention until the referral order was issued in November 2025. He added that, after the defence was able to review the case file once the trial had begun, it found\u2014in his assessment\u2014no new evidence other than National Security Sector investigations, which the defence considers insufficient on their own to substantiate the charges. The defence relied on this in arguing that the evidence was insufficient and requesting his release. Mounir also considers that, in this case, referral was not linked to the approaching maximum period of pretrial detention, but rather reflected a broader trend towards referring a number of State Security cases to trial.<\/p>\n

In Yasser Abu Al-Ela\u2019s case, the defence described a similar trajectory, stating that the investigation saw no significant developments after the initial questioning session, while detention-renewal orders continued until the referral order was issued. The defence differs, however, in its interpretation of the timing of the referral, considering it likely to have been connected to the approaching maximum period of pretrial detention, while stressing that this assessment is not, in itself, sufficient to establish a causal relationship between the two.<\/p>\n

Hamdy El-Zaeem\u2019s case is the longest of those examined in this paper: he remained in pretrial detention for nearly four years before being referred to trial in January 2025. According to the defence, no substantive new investigative steps were taken during this period, while requests for release were repeatedly rejected despite arguments based on his health and the length of his detention. Detention-renewal hearings thus became the most recurrent procedure in the case until the referral order was issued.<\/p>\n

Ashraf Omar\u2019s case presents a somewhat different dimension. Although his period of pretrial detention was shorter than in the other cases, the referral order reformulated the charges, dropping three of them, retaining the charge of financing a terrorist group, and adding a charge of participating with a terrorist group in achieving its objectives, according to the defence. This indicates that referral did more than move the proceedings to court; it also redefined the scope of the charges. That change did not, however, alter his position as regards continued detention, which persisted after referral as hearings were adjourned more than once, most recently until October 2026 to hear testimony from the officer who conducted the field inquiries.[28]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

A comparison of the four cases highlights two main observations. First, in most cases the continuation of pretrial detention was not accompanied by investigative activity at a comparable pace: substantive investigation was concentrated at the outset, while detention-renewal orders continued for lengthy periods. Second, differences in the defence teams\u2019 explanations of the timing of referral\u2014some linking it to a broader policy of referring State Security cases to trial, others to the proximity of the maximum statutory limits for pretrial detention\u2014do not alter the common conclusion emerging from the facts: referral came after prolonged periods of detention that, according to the defence accounts, were not accompanied by comparable developments in the investigation.<\/p>\n

These observations do not determine whether the charges are well founded or the evidence sufficient; those matters remain for the trial court to decide. They do, however, explain the procedural background from which the cases moved into the trial stage. The question, therefore, is whether referral\u2014after years of detention and investigation\u2014produced any substantive change in the journalists\u2019 legal status and defence safeguards. The following section addresses that question.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Third: Referral to Trial and Its Impact on Journalists\u2019 Legal Status<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Defence accounts in the cases under study indicate that one of the first problems at this stage concerned when the defence learned of the referral decision and when it was able to access the case file. In Khaled Mamdouh\u2019s case, lawyer Mokhtar Mounir stated that the defence did not learn of the referral until his client was formally notified of it and was unable to obtain a copy of the case file until after the first trial hearing had taken place. This forced the defence to request an adjournment in order to review the file and prepare its case. Mounir added that, once the file was obtained and reviewed, it revealed\u2014in his assessment\u2014no new material or technical evidence supporting the charges and relied primarily on National Security Sector investigations. This became a central element of the defence arguments before the court.<\/p>\n

A similar pattern appears in Hamdy El-Zaeem\u2019s case. According to the defence, his legal team did not learn of the referral until their client was brought before the prosecution to be notified of it, and they did not obtain a copy of the case file until after the first trial hearing. During this stage, requests for release remained unsuccessful, while El-Zaeem remained detained during the proceedings despite the defence invoking the length of his detention and his health condition. The defence also stated that it found no new material or technical evidence in the file linking him to the charges, and that the referral order altered one of the charges by replacing \u201cpublishing false news and statements\u201d with \u201cparticipating in a criminal agreement\u201d, without any corresponding change in his continued detention.<\/p>\n

The defence account in Yasser Abu Al-Ela\u2019s case supports the same pattern. According to his lawyer, the defence did not obtain a copy of the case papers until after the first trial hearing, and referral produced no change in the journalist\u2019s detention status: he remained in custody after the case moved to court. The defence also referred to continuing difficulties in communicating with him during trial hearings held at the Badr court complex because of the use of a glass cage. In its assessment, this affected the effectiveness of communication between the defendant and his lawyer and the preparation of the defence during the trial.<\/p>\n

Ashraf Omar\u2019s case illustrates a different aspect of the effects of referral. When the referral order was issued, the prosecution reformulated the charges against him, dropping a number of those he had faced during the investigation, retaining the charge of \u201cfinancing a terrorist group\u201d, and adding the charge of \u201cparticipating with a terrorist group in achieving its objectives\u201d. This demonstrates that a referral order does not merely transfer proceedings to a court; it also defines the scope of the charges that the court will hear. Nevertheless, the change was not accompanied by any change in his liberty: he remained detained after referral, and his trial hearings were adjourned more than once, most recently until 12 October 2026 to hear testimony from the officer who conducted the field inquiries. In this case too, therefore, the transfer of proceedings to the court did not bring an end to the restrictions that had accompanied the investigation stage.<\/p>\n

The significance of these facts emerges not from each case in isolation, but from comparing them. Despite differences in the length of detention, the nature of the charges and certain procedures specific to each case, the four cases reveal three common indicators accompanying the transition to trial.<\/p>\n

One of these is that, in more than one case, referral was not accompanied by access for the defence to the case file before trial began. The lawyers for Khaled Mamdouh, Hamdy El-Zaeem and Yasser Abu Al-Ela did not obtain copies of the case papers until after the first hearing had taken place, forcing them to seek adjournments in order to review the files and prepare the defence. This raises questions about whether the safeguards that should accompany the transition to trial were realised in practice, particularly since Article 14(3)(b) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights[29]<\/sup><\/a> guarantees every defendant \u201cadequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence\u201d. General Comment No. 32, paragraph 33, of the Human Rights Committee further states that this guarantee requires the defence to be given access to the material on which the prosecution relies sufficiently in advance of trial to allow effective preparation, rather than only after trial hearings have begun.<\/p>\n

These observations do not mean that referral to trial was a merely formal measure with no legal effect. Jurisdiction did in fact pass from the Supreme State Security Prosecution to the trial court, which became the authority responsible for hearing the case and deciding applications for release. A comparison of the four cases nevertheless indicates that this legal transfer of jurisdiction was, in most instances, not matched by a comparable change in the journalists\u2019 practical legal position. They remained detained after referral; in more than one case, the defence did not gain access to the case papers until later; and the trials continued while the defendants remained in custody. The practical effect of referral was therefore narrower than the legal framework governing it might suggest.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

This conclusion is significant in light of the international standards discussed above, which require continued detention before judgment to remain subject to specific grounds and judicial review rather than follow automatically from the continuation of proceedings. In the cases examined, the defence accounts indicate that the transfer of the cases to trial did not result in the release of any of the four journalists; all remained detained while their cases were heard by the trial court.[30]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

The four cases show that referral to trial did not end the disputes that had characterised the investigation stage; rather, it moved them into a new phase. Instead of focusing on the lawfulness of continuing the investigation or the grounds for pretrial detention, the dispute came to centre on the extent to which the defence could exercise its rights before the court and on whether the journalists\u2019 circumstances changed once their cases moved to the trial court. This suggests that the transfer of proceedings to a court was not, in itself, sufficient to produce the change in an accused person\u2019s legal status contemplated by law.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Conclusion and Recommendations<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

The cases examined in this paper show that referral of the journalists\u2019 cases to trial did not, in itself, constitute a fundamental change in their legal or procedural circumstances. Although the proceedings moved from the investigation stage to the trial court, the journalists remained detained in all of the cases studied; in more than one case, defence access to the case papers was delayed; and the trials continued amid repeated adjournments. This indicates that, in practice, the transfer of jurisdiction to the court did not produce the degree of change in defence safeguards or in the circumstances of detained journalists envisaged by law.<\/p>\n

The importance of this conclusion lies in shifting the discussion from referral as a legal procedure to its practical effects. The true significance of referral lies not merely in transferring proceedings from the investigating authority to a court, but in the safeguards that should follow from that transition\u2014foremost among them effective judicial review of continued detention, access for the defence to the case papers and adequate opportunity to prepare its case, and the commencement of trial within a reasonable time.<\/p>\n