Contents
Methodology
Introduction
First: Monitoring patterns of interference in digital content
Second: Methods of mass surveillance: technical capabilities and procedural frameworks
Third: Do Egyptian laws allow security agencies to carry out mass surveillance?
Conclusion and recommendations on the protection of digital privacy and freedom of expression
Methodology
This paper is based on an analysis of the content of official statements published on the Egyptian Ministry of the Interior’s official Facebook page, as these reflect the institutional framing of events and the nature of security interventions as officially presented. The paper draws on a database comprising 400 official statements published between April 2025 and April 2026, which were collected using the Apify tool and then manually coded and categorised. The “official statement” was adopted as the unit of analysis, given the information it contains regarding the incident, the point at which the intervention began, and the measures taken.
The incidents were categorised according to a set of variables, including incident type, reason for intervention, nature of the content, response time, collaborating parties, and incident outcome. Certain classifications were also standardised, such as: “reason for intervention”, to allow for accurate quantitative analysis by combining the various formulations associated with circulating content within the “monitoring” category. The aim is to monitor patterns of security intervention, focusing on identifying the point at which action was initiated, measuring its distribution across monitoring, reports and investigations, and determining the relationship between the type of incident and the nature of the action taken.
The paper also draws on the national legal framework as a reference. This framework includes the Egyptian Constitution, the Code of Criminal Procedure No. 150 of 1950, the Telecommunications Regulation Act No. 10 of 2003, the Cybercrime Act No. 175 of 2018, the Personal Data Protection Act No. 151 of 2020, and the Anti-Terrorism Act No. 94 of 2015.
This paper draws on relevant international standards relating to the protection of privacy, namely Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and General Comment No. 16 of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). It also draws on a number of human rights reports published by local and international organisations concerned with digital rights and privacy. In addition, a number of news reports and articles covering the development of digital surveillance policies in Egypt, electronic monitoring projects, and the mechanisms by which law enforcement agencies deal with content circulating on social media platforms were consulted. These sources were used as explanatory and contextual material to aid in understanding the technical and legal environment surrounding the practices under study, without relying on them as a primary source of data or for drawing quantitative conclusions.
This paper does not seek to provide a comprehensive account of all the Ministry of the Interior’s interventions, but rather limits itself to analysing what is officially published, as an indicator of patterns of intervention as presented institutionally, whilst acknowledging the limitations and selectivity of this source.
Introduction
In recent years, there has been a marked increase in the Egyptian Ministry of the Interior’s engagement with content circulating on social media platforms. We note that it has issued official statements that frequently include announcements regarding the ‘clarification of the circumstances’ surrounding events or crimes linked to content circulating on social media platforms. These developments raise questions about the nature of security intervention in digital content, and whether such content forms part of ongoing investigations or serves as a starting point for security agencies to take action against social media users.
This pattern is not limited to incidents linked to specific and clear-cut crimes, such as acts of violence, theft, fraud or extortion, but extends to include other incidents, ranging from circulating digital content to interactions and posts on social media platforms, which indicates that the scope of intervention has broadened to encompass citizens’ social behaviour.
This observation takes on particular significance in light of the findings of the data under study, which indicate that a significant proportion of interventions begin with the monitoring of content circulating on social media, whereas official reports play a limited role as a starting point for action. We therefore raise questions here about the nature of this pattern of intervention, and whether it reflects an expansion in the scope of security monitoring of the digital sphere, and the limits of this expansion.
Mass surveillance of the digital space can be understood as a practice involving the large-scale monitoring, collection and analysis of data and content, without any prior link to specific suspicions regarding particular individuals, meaning that it is applied to the general public rather than targeting individual cases[1]. This approach differs from surveillance linked to criminal investigations, which is triggered by a specific incident and is, by its very nature, subject to procedural controls, whereas mass surveillance is based on the assumption that the digital sphere can be continuously monitored in search of potential incidents.
This practice constitutes a violation of the rights of social media users. In this context, international law guarantees the protection of the right to privacy; Article 17[2] of the ICCPR prohibits any arbitrary or unlawful interference with private life or correspondence. In light of this, any infringement of the right to privacy must be based on a clear legal basis, have a legitimate aim, and be limited to what is strictly necessary. Discussion of this paper can only begin by clarifying key terms to avoid any ambiguity, as follows:
- Mass surveillance: Amnesty International defines ‘surveillance’ as ‘the monitoring of a person’s communications, actions or movements’; this definition provides a general overview of surveillance as an activity involving the tracking of individuals and the collection of information about them[3]. In the digital context, however, surveillance takes on more complex forms linked to the collection, analysis and use of data. In this context, the OHCHR report on The Right To Privacy In The Digital Age notes that authorities in more than one country have begun to collect and analyse posts on social media and professional and private networks built on publicly available communication platforms; these practices range from tracking specific users to collecting, storing and analysing vast amounts of data[4].
For the purposes of this paper, digital surveillance refers to the monitoring, collection and analysis of individuals’ data, activities and digital content across digital platforms, whether in the context of tracking specific users or collecting broader ranges of data.
- Personal data: Article 1 of the Personal Data Protection Act No. 151 of 2020 defines personal data as: “any data relating to an identified natural person, or a person who can be identified, directly or indirectly, by linking such data with other data, such as a name, voice, image, identification number, online identifier, or any data revealing psychological, health, economic, cultural or social identity”[5].
This paper begins with a key question regarding whether the patterns of interference with digital content revealed by official data are consistent with national and international legal safeguards governing privacy and digital rights. To answer this question, the paper analyzes the point at which the intervention begins, the types of incidents being monitored, and the nature of the measures taken, and then compares the findings with the relevant national legal framework and international standards.
First: Monitoring patterns of interference with digital content
Firstly, an analysis of a sample of official data published on the Ministry of the Interior’s official Facebook page between April 2025 and April 2026 reveals a clear pattern in how incidents related to content circulating on social media platforms are handled. The data is not limited to presenting the results of investigations, but directly reflects the mechanisms of security agencies’ intervention in the digital sphere and the starting point for such intervention.
In terms of the point at which intervention began, the data indicates that 62.5% of the cases under study began with the monitoring of content circulating on social media, compared with just 5% that began on the basis of official reports, whilst the remainder was divided between security investigations (19.8%) and administrative campaigns and enforcement (12.8%). This distribution reflects that direct monitoring of content published in the digital sphere is the predominant starting point[6]. The data under study also reveals that monitoring is not limited to crimes occurring in the public domain, but encompasses multiple types of digital content and behaviour, varying in nature and level of severity.
The cases under review reveal a recurring presence of content of a moral or behavioural nature, particularly those involving content creators, such as live streams and videos described in official statements as “indecent” or “contrary to family and community values”. In this type of case, digital content is not merely a means of uncovering an existing crime, but becomes the very subject and object of the crime itself; legal proceedings commence as soon as the clip is circulated or goes viral, with the relevant authorities immediately examining and assessing it, and subsequently identifying those responsible and prosecuting them[7].
Conversely, the data reveals other incidents linked to cybercrimes outside the content industry, such as blackmail, defamation and harassment. Here, digital evidence and media become a key tool for establishing the facts of the case and identifying the perpetrators, making digital monitoring an essential aid in the course of a criminal investigation[8].
The scope does not stop there, but extends to include digitally published material relating to public life and everyday events, such as footage of altercations, traffic offences, and gatherings that have sparked widespread engagement on social media platforms. This diversity reflects the broadening scope of monitoring and tracking to include different types of digital content, even in cases that do not involve violent crimes, direct and obvious harm, or those that did not begin with direct official reports[9].
This clear focus on content creators takes on particular significance when considering the nature of the incidents in question. All of them relate to content that has been assessed on the basis of its moral nature, style of presentation, or the language used. The data, together with the incidents monitored over the course of a year, reveal a recurring pattern of intervention targeting entertainment content related to dance, manner of speech, and appearance.
In this context, digital surveillance does not appear to be directed solely at crimes in which digital media are used as a means of uncovering a crime or tracking down its perpetrators, but also extends to monitoring patterns of behaviour and expression within the digital sphere, particularly when the content relates to specific social groups or lifestyles that do not conform to officially accepted social norms. This is particularly evident in cases where official data relies on vague descriptions, such as ‘violation of family values’, ‘offence to public decency’ or ‘infringement of societal values’, without always referring to direct harm or specific victims. This is consistent with the findings of a report published by AFTE titled “From Violating Family Values to Terrorism Charges: How Egyptian Authorities Constrain the Digital Space.[10]”
The official statements themselves also reveal a clear element of spectacle in the way the facts are presented, with repeated references to the ‘apprehension’ of content creators for videos posted with the aim of ‘increasing views’ or ‘generating profit’, accompanied by the publication of photographs of the accused or of the seized cameras or mobile phones. This reflects the fact that the Ministry of the Interior is working to present certain types of digital behaviour as grounds for arrest or social deterrence. This approach also constitutes a violation of the suspects’ privacy, as the publications make it possible to identify their faces and social media accounts.
The practice of collective surveillance has been on the rise recently, with the arrest of “Sayed Moshagheb”, a member of the “Ultras White Knights” group and others[11], following the circulation of videos documenting a gathering and celebrations upon his release from prison. The defence argued that these videos “drew attention” and were the reason for the security authorities’ intervention. This illustrates how the circulation of digital content itself can trigger intervention, without the need for a formal complaint[12].
When these indicators are considered together, it becomes clear that the data not only reflects a variety of incidents, but also reveals a consistent pattern of intervention based on the direct monitoring of digital content, linking it to specific individuals, and then taking legal action on that basis, regardless of the nature of the incident or its level of seriousness.
This pattern raises fundamental legal questions regarding the extent to which such practices are consistent with the principles governing interference with privacy, foremost among which is the principle of lawfulness, which requires a clear legal basis for procedures ranging from the monitoring of digital content to data collection, identification and the taking of legal action. Likewise, the principle of necessity requires that intervention should only be resorted to if justified by a legitimate and specific objective, and the principle of proportionality requires that the measures taken do not exceed what is required by the nature of the act and the objective to be achieved[13].
Secondly: Methods of mass surveillance between technical capabilities and procedural processes
The data in the previous section reveals that 62.5% of the cases under study begin with the monitoring of circulating content, compared to just 5% that begin with reports, raising the question: how does this monitoring process actually take place? This distribution does not merely reflect a shift in the starting point of intervention, but points to the existence of a structure that allows for the large-scale monitoring of digital content, followed by security intervention within a short timeframe[14].
In this context, the origins of this framework can be traced back to 2014. In that year, the Ministry of the Interior launched a technical project entitled ‘System for Monitoring Security Risks on Social Media Networks’, which aimed to establish a system capable of monitoring and analysing content circulating on digital platforms using search tools based on keywords and interaction analysis. Although this project was not launched as a formal institutional unit, it marked the starting point for the integration of digital monitoring into security work and, according to legal and media indicators, has continued to serve as a general framework for practice[15].
Monitoring is not limited to the telecommunications infrastructure; it extends to tracking content published on social media platforms themselves, whether through analytical tools or by monitoring widely shared content, which enhances the ability to capture content as soon as it is circulated, without waiting for official reports. In this context, monitoring does not appear as a separate measure, but rather as part of an integrated procedural process that can be deduced from the recurring phrasing in official statements, beginning with content monitoring and ending with on-the-ground intervention.
This process begins with an ‘initial monitoring’ phase, during which content circulating on digital platforms is captured, either through analytical tools or as a result of its dissemination. At this stage, the existence of a formal complaint is not a prerequisite for taking action; rather, the content itself is treated as an indicator warranting further investigation. This stage may rely on systems supported by artificial intelligence and data analysis to capture keywords and patterns of expression and to monitor accounts, even those attempting to use digital anonymization tools such as virtual private networks (VPNs)[16].
In terms of communications and network surveillance, security agencies possess advanced capabilities for monitoring and analyzing digital data; this includes the use of sophisticated technologies capable of examining network traffic. Among the most prominent of these technologies is “Deep Packet Inspection,” which does not merely read users’ general metadata but extends to examining and reading the content of communications and messages themselves, thereby enabling the precise tracking of users and monitoring of their digital activity[17]. In some cases, these technologies have been associated with products from international companies such as Blue Coat Systems, which have been used globally and locally for surveillance and censorship[18].
As for social media monitoring, commercial tools specializing in content analysis and interaction tracking are available, such as (Hootsuite, AIM Insights, Sprout Social[19]). Although there is no official announcement or documentation indicating that the government uses these specific commercial software programs, the sorting and analysis capabilities of these tools make it likely that authorities use them or similar parallel technologies.
The process then moves on to the “identification” phase, which involves linking content to specific accounts or individuals using available data, thereby enabling the transition from digital content to specific individuals. In the context of the evolution of digital verification tools, the Ministry of Interior has developed a unified national platform for “biometric verification and real-time authentication” via a smartphone app (MOIEG-PASS). This platform relies on locally developed algorithms for facial recognition[20]. Although the platform was officially introduced as a tool to secure citizens’ interactions and data with the Ministry’s digital services, the availability of this technical infrastructure locally provides the security system with advanced channels for immediate matching and verification of users’ digital identities when necessary.
The incident may then proceed to the “legal proceedings phase”, which may involve referring it to the competent investigative authorities to take or initiate the necessary measures depending on the nature of the incident and the required action. This phase varies in terms of surveillance requirements and legal authorization, depending on the type of action taken and the jurisdictional limits of the law enforcement and investigative authorities. Finally, this process concludes with the “field intervention and enforcement” stage, which involves apprehension or the initiation of legal proceedings and often occurs within a relatively short timeframe, reflecting the rapid transition from monitoring to enforcement in many cases[21].
In this context, the General Directorate for the Protection of Public Morals within the specialized police department frequently appears in cases involving moral issues, suggesting that handling this type of content has been entrusted to a specialized unit within the police force; however, there is no corresponding detailed official disclosure regarding its operational mechanisms in the digital sphere. Nevertheless, the frequent reference to it in official statements, coupled with the fact that cases often begin with the “monitoring” of circulating content, suggests that its role is not limited to ex post intervention but extends—in some cases—to tracking and addressing this type of content from its earliest stages.
This process is evident in practice in cases involving content creators, as we explained earlier, where the intervention begins with monitoring videos posted on personal accounts or public pages, followed by examining this content and identifying those responsible, leading to legal action against them. Data indicates multiple cases in which content creators were apprehended after posting clips containing behaviours or statements deemed to be in violation[22], where these clips were monitored and analyzed, and the creators were apprehended with the phones used to film them in their possession; when confronted, they admitted to posting the content with the aim of achieving viewership or profits[23]. Other cases also emerged involving circulating digital content, where the spread of such content led to an investigation, the identification of those responsible, and the subsequent initiation of legal proceedings against them.
When considering these indicators collectively, it becomes clear that digital mass surveillance is not based on a single tool or a publicly announced system, but rather on an accumulation of tools and procedures that allow for the widespread monitoring of content, followed by a shift from general monitoring to targeted intervention on a case-by-case basis.
Third: Do Egyptian laws allow security agencies to carry out mass surveillance?
In light of the practices referred to, questions are mounting regarding the existence of a clear legislative basis granting executive bodies the authority to carry out mass surveillance, including content monitoring, data collection, and the analysis of users’ digital behaviour on a large scale. This issue takes on particular significance in light of the findings in the previous chapter, which showed, as mentioned earlier, that 62.5% of the cases under study began with the monitoring of circulating content, compared to just 5% that began with formal complaints. This analysis implies a distinction between two different modes of surveillance, which cannot be subject to the same legal framework.
The first type is individual surveillance, which relates to a specific incident or suspicion regarding a particular individual, takes place within the framework of a clear criminal investigation, and is subject—at least in principle—to procedural safeguards, including the requirement to obtain judicial authorisation[24]. The second type is mass surveillance, which is based on the collection, monitoring and analysis of digital behaviour on a large scale, without any prior link to a specific incident or suspicion regarding an individual. This is the type of surveillance most closely resembling the practices revealed by the data under study, particularly with regard to the proactive monitoring of circulating content and intervention based on it.
This practice raises fundamental legal issues, given that it constitutes a significant encroachment on the right to privacy, which is protected by the Egyptian Constitution in Article 57[25] as well as by international standards, foremost among which is Article 17[26] of the ICCPR, which prohibits any arbitrary or unlawful interference with private life or correspondence. According to the interpretation of the OHCHR, this prohibition is not limited to unlawful interference, but extends to interference that lacks necessity or proportionality[27], even if it is based on a legal foundation.
It should be noted that the content posted by users for the purposes of social media and communicating with virtual friends and followers cannot, as a whole, be monitored and analysed by law enforcement agencies. When an individual shares a photograph of a party, a private event or similar, they do not thereby grant permission to an entity such as the Ministry of the Interior to track, store and analyse that data. This is confirmed by international conventions and reports issued by OHCHR on ‘The Right To Privacy In The Digital Age’, which clearly state that a user making some of their data available online does not mean they forfeit their right to privacy, nor does it grant the authorities the right to mass surveillance or tracking without strict legal justification[28].
With reference to the Egyptian legislative framework, it is clear that the relevant laws grant state agencies powers relating to the monitoring of communications and digital activities; however, these powers are—for the most part—linked to specific circumstances and do not provide explicit regulation of mass surveillance. Under the Telecommunications Regulation Law No. 10 of 2003[29], telecommunications companies are required to provide the technical capabilities that enable national security agencies to exercise their powers. Although this provision is broad, it does not specify the scope of these capabilities or the limits on their use, nor does it distinguish between surveillance linked to specific incidents and mass surveillance, which leaves room for broad interpretations without detailed safeguards.
Article 46 of the Anti-Terrorism Act No. 94 of 2015[30] authorises the Public Prosecution or the competent investigating authority – by means of a reasoned judicial order – to take measures relating to the monitoring and recording of conversations or similar communications and the interception of correspondence in the context of terrorist offences, thereby broadening the scope of interference with communications within the framework of an ongoing investigation.
With the Cybercrime Law No. 175 of 2018[31], a legal framework for accessing digital data has been established, whereby Article 2 requires service providers to retain usage data and user identification data. Furthermore, Article 6 permits – by order of the investigating authority – the seizure, tracking or blocking of data or websites whenever this is necessary for the investigation of a crime. It is clear from the above that these provisions presuppose the existence of a crime or an ongoing criminal investigation, and do not explicitly provide for the permissibility of general, proactive content monitoring.
With reference to the Code of Criminal Procedure No. 150 of 1950, it is clear that the role of judicial police officers is not limited to receiving reports, but extends to investigating crimes and their perpetrators and gathering evidence relating thereto. This explains the possibility of taking action without the requirement of a prior formal report.
The provision in question grants law enforcement officers general powers to investigate and gather evidence; however, it does not specify in detail how these powers are to be exercised in the context of large-scale digital surveillance of social media users. Relying on this provision as a justification for mass surveillance therefore constitutes an arbitrary interpretation of the law.
As for the Police Authority Law[32], although it grants police officers broad powers to maintain security and public order, it does not contain explicit provisions regulating digital surveillance or establishing a specific framework for it.
Although civil society organisations previously attempted to challenge a tender issued by the Ministry of the Interior in 2014[33] for software enabling mass surveillance, the Administrative Court did not grant civil society’s requests[34].
When these texts are taken together, it becomes clear that the Egyptian legal framework has gradually expanded the powers to access data and interfere with content in the context of investigations or in the cases specified, without establishing a system of mass surveillance.
Conclusion and Recommendations
There remains a significant gap between the letter of Egyptian law and its practical application with regard to mass surveillance, and this issue becomes even more complex when considering the nature of the content being monitored, as its availability on social media platforms does not mean that it is no longer protected by law. Under Egyptian law, certain forms of content relating to individuals – such as photographs, videos or data associated with personal accounts – may fall within the scope of personal data if they allow the person to be identified directly or indirectly.
The Personal Data Protection Act No. 151 of 2020[35] regulates the conditions for the collection, processing and disclosure of data, and makes such activities subject to the requirement of explicit consent from the data subject or the existence of a legal basis authorising such processing. This provision reflects a fundamental legal principle: that the availability of data does not imply permission for its use or for it to be subject to monitoring or analysis without controls. However, we note that the law itself excludes national security agencies from its scope of application, which opens the door to practices relating to the collection and analysis of data outside the general framework of protection, in the absence of detailed regulations defining the scope and limits of this exception.
This understanding is consistent with international standards, which do not link the protection of privacy to the nature of access to information, but rather to how it is used by the state. Article 17 of the ICCPR prohibits any arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy or correspondence.
In its interpretation of this article, OHCHR[36] has emphasised that protection extends to all forms of information relating to individuals, and that describing an interference as ‘arbitrary’ is not limited to the absence of a legal basis, but also encompasses cases where the interference is unnecessary or disproportionate. Furthermore, United Nations reports on “The Right To Privacy In The Digital Age” indicate that the collection and analysis of data – even if available online – constitutes an infringement of privacy, particularly if carried out on a large scale or without clear restrictions, which places limits on the use of circulating content as a justification for interference[37].
In light of this, treating personal accounts and the content posted on them as a public domain for monitoring—simply because they are accessible online—constitutes a violation of digital privacy. The implications of such practices are not limited to the right to privacy, but also extend to freedom of expression within the digital sphere. When the scope of monitoring expands to encompass diverse forms of digital content and behaviour, relying on generalised descriptions such as ‘family values’ or ‘offending public decency’, the boundaries between what constitutes legitimate expression and what may become subject to intervention are blurred.
The impact of these practices is not limited to cases that result in actual legal action; it may also extend to what is known as the ‘chilling effect’, whereby the fear of surveillance or the prospect of legal accountability leads individuals to modify their digital behaviour or to refrain from certain forms of expression, debate or content creation as a precautionary measure. United Nations reports on privacy in the digital age have noted that the existence of widespread surveillance programs may affect individuals’ ability to exercise their fundamental rights, including freedom of expression[38].
The issue of digital privacy is inextricably linked to freedom of expression in the digital environment, as individuals’ exercise of their right to expression is tied to their digital presence and the associated data, activities, and interactions online. Digital rights literature has noted that the expansion of individuals’ digital presence has blurred the boundaries between the public and private spheres, making the exercise of rights in the digital space more closely tied to how data is collected, used, and monitored. In this context, interference with privacy affects not only data protection but may also extend to individuals’ ability to exercise their right to expression, participation, and interaction within the digital sphere in a safe and independent manner[39].
In light of the above, there is a clear need for legislative and institutional intervention based on:
- Restricting the use of surveillance measures or the tracking of digital data to cases linked to ongoing criminal investigations or where there is serious evidence of a crime having been committed, and refraining from broadly interpreting the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure as a basis for general or continuous monitoring of content circulating on social media platforms.
- Establish a legal framework that clearly and explicitly criminalises any practices of mass surveillance, and prohibits security agencies from accessing, storing and using the data of social media users.
- Repeal Article 25 of Law No. 175 of 2028 on combating information technology crimes, which punishes with imprisonment and a fine anyone who violates “the principles or family values of Egyptian society”.
- Repeal Article 178 of the Penal Code No. 58 of 1937 relating to public indecency.
[1] Privacy International, “Mass Surveillance,” accessed May 20, 2026. https://privacyinternational.org/learn/mass-surveillance/ [2] United Nations, “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and accession by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2200 (XXI) of December 16, 1966, Article 17. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights – International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [3] Amnesty International, “Your Two-Minute Guide to Mass Surveillance,” accessed May 20, 2026. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2015/03/easy-guide-to-mass-surveillance/ [4] United Nations Human Rights Council, The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, A/HRC/51/17, paras. 35–37, accessed May 20, 2026. https://docs.un.org/ar/A/HRC/51/17 [5] Personal Data Protection Law No. 151 of 2020, Legal Publications https://manshurat.org/node/66932 [6] AFTE, Analysis of data from the Ministry of the Interior’s official Facebook page for the period from April 2025 to April 2026, unpublished database, prepared by the researcher. [7] Ibid. [8] Ibid. [9] Ibid. [10] AFTE, “From Violating Family Values to Terrorism Charges: How Egyptian Authorities Constrain the Digital Space (TikTok as a Case Study),” last accessed May 20, 2026: https://afteegypt.org/en/research-en/2026/02/05/40066-afteegypt.html?utm.com [11] Renewal of detention for Sayed Moshagheb and others pending investigation," Al-Manassa, accessed April 16, 2026. https://manassa.news/news/31403 [13]United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 16: Article 17 (Right to Privacy), 1988. https://www.refworld.org/legal/general/hrc/1988/27539 [14] AFTE, Analysis of data from the Ministry of the Interior’s official Facebook page for the period from April 2025 to April 2026, unpublished database, prepared by the researcher. [15] Project Brief on Monitoring Security Risks on Social Media Networks,” Egyptian Ministry of the Interior, Limited Practice No. 22, 2013/2014. https://afteegypt.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/MOI-SNSHM-rfp-June-2014_ar.pdf?utm [16] “Egyptian Interior Ministry Establishes Monitoring Units to Combat Crime on Social Media,” Al-Sharq, July 19, 2025. https://tinyurl.com/2nma9dw7 [17] Talaat Al-Sanadili, “Social Media Under Scrutiny: How Is the Ministry of the Interior Addressing Content That Threatens Public Safety?”, Al-Ahram, August 3, 2025. https://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/5259722.aspx [18] Hisham Aref, “When the Buyer Warns You,” Third Perspective, February 9, 2026. https://185.16.38.103/spy-companies/?__cpo=aHR0cHM6Ly96YXdpYTMuY29t Mohamed Taher, Marwa Fetfata, “Egypt: A Long History of Internet and Communications Surveillance,” AccessNow, October 2020, https://tinyurl.com/3mrwfm9p Masar – Technology and Law Community, “Blue Coat Systems,” June 27, 2022. https://tinyurl.com/y59yc9aj [19] Abeer Mohammed, “Online Social Media Monitoring,” AIM Technologies, November 28, 2024, https://tinyurl.com/4n6rb5jn [20] “Unified National Platform for Biometric Verification and Real-Time Authentication,” official website of the Ministry of the Interior, February 14, 2026, https://tinyurl.com/mce5n74j “How Did the Ministry of the Interior's Page Become a Safe Haven for Egyptians' Complaints?”, Al-Watan, February 14, 2026, https://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/8224793 [21] Ibid. [22] Egyptian Ministry of Interior: “Content creator arrested for posting videos on social media,” Video posted on the Ministry of Interior’s official Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/reel/2089578624943003 [23] Egyptian Ministry of Interior: “Content creators arrested for posting videos on social media,” Video posted on the Ministry of Interior’s official Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/reel/2007490480124225 [24] The Egyptian procedural system governs the inherent jurisdiction of judicial police officers in investigating crimes and gathering evidence in accordance with Article 21 of Law No. 150 of 1950, while establishing strict boundaries that require them to obtain a prior, reasoned order from the competent investigative authority when initiating procedures that affect digital or personal rights and freedoms, based on Article 6 of the Information Technology Crimes Law No. 175 of 2018, and Article 46 of the Anti-Terrorism Law No. 94 of 2015. [25] The Egyptian Constitution, “The Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt of 2014,” Article 57 https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Egypt_2014.pdf?lang=ar [26] United Nations, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 17. https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights [27] UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 16, 1988. [28] United Nations Human Rights Council, The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, Ibid. [29] Telecommunications Regulation Act No. 10 of 2003, Article 64 [30] ‘Anti-Terrorism Act No. 94 of 2015’, Legal Publications, accessed 8 May 2026. https://manshurat.org/node/14679 [31] The Cybercrime Law No. 175 of 2018 [32] Police Authority Law No. 109 of 1971, Legal Publications. https://manshurat.org/node/33490 [33] AFTE , “Legal action to halt monitoring of social media networks”, 19 June 2014, last accessed on 8 May 2026. https://afteegypt.org/legal-profiles-2/legal-news/2014/06/19/7946-afteegypt.html [34] Mohamed Hamama, “Administrative Court Rejects Appeal Against Interior Ministry’s Plan to Monitor Social Media Networks”, Mada Masr, 28 February 2017. https://tinyurl.com/4v6sw6a2 [35] The Personal Data Protection Act No. 151 of 2020, Article 1 (Definition of Personal Data), and Articles 2–4 concerning the conditions for the collection, processing and disclosure of data. [36] Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’, United Nations, Article 17. https://www.ohchr.org/ar/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights?utm_source=chatgpt.com [37] United Nations News Centre, “The right to privacy in the digital age: General Assembly adopts resolution on the right to privacy in the digital age”, 18 December 2013, accessed 20 May 2026. https://news.un.org/ar/story/2013/12/193452?utm_.com [38] Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, A/HRC/27/37, June 30, 2014, paras. 14–20.https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/777869?utm_.com&v=pdf [39] Masar – Technology and Law Community, “Civil and Political Rights in a Digital World: Digital Identity and the Concept of Cybercitizenship”, accessed 20 May 2026. 026.https://masaar.net/ar/digital-rights-between-the-real-and-virtual-worlds/?utm.
